

Uncaptive Minds

VOL. IV, No 4 (18)

**NOTHING HAS ENDED YET:
Agents in Eastern Europe**

STARTING ANEW IN ESTONIA, LATVIA, AND LITHUANIA

CZECH - SLOVAK TALKS

WINTER 91-92



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
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Uncaptive Minds

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Uncaptive Minds provides information and opinion on political and social affairs in Eastern Europe



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with **ZDZISŁAW RURARZ**

Zdzisław Rurarz was the Polish ambassador to Japan until December 1981, when he resigned to protest the imposition of martial law. He was granted asylum in the United States, where he currently lives with his wife. In early 1982, he was sentenced in absentia to death, a sentence which has since been lifted.

NOTHING HAS ENDED YET

UM

You do not trust the Polish authorities, I gather, for you have not returned to Poland.

RURARZ

Judging from the difficulties I have met in trying to obtain full exoneration and the restoration of my citizenship, it seems to me that the legacy of the Polish People's Republic has been preserved in the Republic of Poland. The issue is doubly complicated in my case, because I am sure that I was also sentenced by the Soviets. However, they never made public such sentences and thus I cannot be sure if I was pardoned by them. And not only are their troops still in Poland — so is the Soviet "fifth column."

UM

You trust the Polish authorities as little as you do the Soviets?

RURARZ

It depends on what you mean by "authorities." As to the military and police services, I surely do not trust them. The secret services, especially their military branch, of which I have personal knowledge, remain practically intact from the old times.

UM

No efforts have been made to dismantle these networks?

RURARZ

The surface of both the Polish and the Soviet networks, composed of all sorts of collaborators and spies, has still not been scratched. Not a single individual in Poland has been publicly named. And it seems that none of the collaborators will be revealed in the future, because this is now considered a "state secret"! I for one find it most strange that a state desiring to become democratic has become the guardian of secrets of its totalitarian predecessor.

UM

What are the prospects for "decommunization" in Poland?

RURARZ

Decommunization is necessary, but it is a different matter entirely from uncovering networks of informers and agents. The identities of communist party members are generally well known. The "cadre officers" in Poland's secret services are also largely known. What is unknown is the composition of the secret networks. And what very few realize is that the network of collaborators run by the Polish secret services consisted mostly of *noncommunists*. These people sometimes posed as anticommunists, and undoubtedly managed to infiltrate the opposition at the highest levels. Decommunization would actually divert the nation's attention from the more vital issue of unmasking these networks of collaborators.

UM

Could you describe the security services you have in mind and what their functions were?

RURARZ

In each country, there were actually four networks: a civilian intelligence service, civilian counterintelligence, military intelligence, and military counterintelligence. In Poland, the civilian intelligence and counterintelligence services were subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MSW). These two secret services — or departments — were integral parts of the Security Service (SB), the equivalent of the KGB in the Soviet Union.

After Solidarity came to power in the fall of 1989, the SB was transformed into the Bureau for the Protection of the State (UOP). It is widely believed that the SB's officers were all dismissed, but in reality, about half were rehired by the UOP. And the UOP has released no information on the secret network it inherited.

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The military intelligence and counterintelligence services have been completely untouched. These services now form the Directorate of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, which was recently renamed *Informacje* [the name of the counterintelligence unit formed from part of the front forces organized as the Military Internal Service (WSW) after the war]. It was also subordinated to the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, and removed from any parliamentary or other civilian supervision or authority.

In all the other countries of the bloc — including the former USSR — the civilian intelligence and counterintelligence services have been scaled down, but the military intelligence and counterintelligence services have been upgraded. And as far as I know, military intelligence and counterintelligence remain quite active, both domestically and internationally.

UM

Did the various intelligence services fill different functions?

RURARZ

Military intelligence was concerned primarily with military doctrine, strategy, war-fighting capabilities, and the possible course of enemy combat operations, everything connected with strategic and conventional weaponry, and the organization of the military. However, there are many fields that are considered to be related to the military: economics, demographics, meteorology, just to name a few. Any of these might increase or decrease military potential and effectiveness. Thus, many things that seemed to have little to do with the military fell under the purview of military intelligence. Of course, high technology was the number one priority, since almost all high technology was related in one way or another to military matters.

The primary task of military counterintelligence was to protect all military-related targets, including all industrial enterprises. But military counterintelligence was also involved in other operations. After the imposition of martial law, it was exceptionally active in combating the Solidarity underground, for example.

The civilian intelligence and counterintelligence services were involved in almost everything — the Church, the underground, and so on. Civilian and military counterintelligence overlapped, but by and large there was a division of labor.

UM

Was this whole operation separate from the Soviet network?

RURARZ

Through the Warsaw Pact (and even before), the Soviet and Polish networks collaborated closely with each other. Military counter-intelligence and intelligence in Poland were actually run, in the early 1950s, by Soviet generals. In the civilian services, there were always Soviet advisors. Moreover, the Soviets also had their own informers and agents in Poland. In 1961, the East Bloc countries signed an agreement on the coordination of intelligence operations among the Warsaw Pact nations — which in fact meant they were further subordinating themselves to the Soviets. According to this agreement, the East Bloc countries were banned from interfering in Soviet intelligence operations on their territory.

Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence were — and doubtless continue to be — active in the supervision and direction of the Polish and other services. Remember: the Soviets have had a free hand in Eastern Europe for almost 50 years.

UM

Do Soviet agents still have a free hand in Eastern Europe?

RURARZ

Not a single Soviet agent has been unmasked in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, eastern Germany, Romania, or Bulgaria.

UM

What are they doing now?

RURARZ

It is difficult to say. But I have not the slightest doubt that the transfer of power from the communists to the opposition could not have happened without the involvement of these networks. In fact, evidence has turned up suggesting that these networks were in close contact with the opposition, or a part of it. For example, Jarosław Kaczyński gave an interview in which he said that during talks to form a Solidarity-led government in 1989, he was authorized by Wałęsa to meet informally, which means formally, with two Soviet intelligence operatives. He also admitted to meeting them prior to the June 1989 elections. Mieczysław Rakowski, the former communist prime minister, mentioned in his book that at the time, the government knew of extensive contacts between the Polish opposition and the Soviet embassy.

UM

Some in the opposition say a secret deal preceded the conclusion of the round-table negotiations. Would you agree?

RURARZ

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RURARZ

I was very much disturbed by the quite unusual transfer of power in Poland — especially since the events of 1989 in Poland were not isolated from what happened elsewhere in Eastern Europe that year. In Poland, the transfer of power was negotiated during the round-table talks. The regime's chief negotiator was General Czesław Kiszczak, then minister of internal affairs and a highly experienced veteran of the secret services. My own experience was that these services were highly efficient — remarkably so given how everything else worked. It is inconceivable that these talks could have succeeded without some behind-the-scenes agreement.

In his book, General Kiszczak mentions someone in intelligence who penetrated Solidarity at the highest level. Because this agent was in intelligence, he couldn't have been known to counterintelligence, the agency that was normally charged with the task of infiltrating the opposition. This is a significant admission. But it also shows how little is known — both to us and the people involved in the security agencies. For example, we know that Vladimir Kryuchkov, then KGB chief, had a talk with Tadeusz Mazowiecki in 1989 four days after he was appointed prime minister. We do not know what they discussed, but Mazowiecki left the meeting in what associates termed "a state of shock." Of course, there is a simple reason so little is known: most instructions and orders in the secret services were not written down, but delivered orally.

UM

The round-table agreements were signed almost three years ago. A great deal has happened since then. How are those agreements connected to the situation today?

RURARZ

The round-table agreements hardly exist anymore. But note that they were fulfilled. Lech Wałęsa has destroyed Solidarity as an organization. And no agents or collaborators have been unmasked. The interior ministry had 3 million files; military counterintelligence had 400,000. How many were part of the network? Judging from the number of military counterintelligence cadre officers, at least 70,000; the number of secret collaborators probably ran to the hundreds of thousands. Surely many more were working for the Soviet intelligence services. Where are all of these people? Not a single name in Poland was revealed. Many who were in the opposition, indeed some of the most vociferously anti-communist and anti-Soviet voices, have strangely changed their rhetoric and behavior upon entering the ruling circles. Are they acting in accord with a script written by someone else? We don't know.

UM

Is there any indication how high up this penetration went?

RURARZ

Recently it was discovered that in Lithuania, the vice-chairman of Sajudis and a prominent member of parliament, Virgilijus Čepaitis, was unmasked as a KGB collaborator. He himself confirmed the accusation. I doubt that this is an isolated case.

UM

It seems that the forces of the old regime retain some influence, but does it really matter? Aren't the changes that have taken place so far irreversible?

RURARZ

I am afraid nothing has ended yet. Because these changes have not done away with the legacy of the past, they are not irreversible. In Poland, economic reforms — the so-called shock therapy and marketization — were ill-conceived, and today are widely rejected by Polish society. Seventy percent of the people who voted in the last elections supported parties who campaigned against the government's economic program. And that doesn't include the majority who did not bother to vote. The proliferation of highly personalized and quarrelsome parties does not augur well for democracy. Indeed, I once wrote in jest that if I were asked to design changes for the express purpose of compromising democracy and a free-market economy, I would simply cite the Polish model over the last three years.

UM

Are you saying that the changes are little more than manipulations? Something akin to the "Urban scenario"? [see "Jerzy Urban's Letter to the First Secretary" in the November-December issue of Uncaptive Minds]

RURARZ

I am saying there are mysteries that have not been explained — and with the passage of time, it will be ever more difficult to uncover the truth. The sooner the people involved in these networks are exposed and dismissed, the better it will be — and the more genuine and irreversible — for democratic and free market changes.

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