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INTERNATIONAL FREEDOM REVIEW

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PANAMA

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sheds light on the sources and solutions of these problems in his article titled "Considerations for the Economic Reconstruction of Panama."

Former Polish ambassador to Japan, Zdzislaw Rurarz, sounds a cautionary note in the symphony of euphoria sweeping Poland. His article, "Is Communism Dead in Poland?" questions the popular assessment that the Communist apparatchiks' demise is an accomplished fact. Ambassador Rurarz raises the more insidious possibility that Communists are engaged in a strategic retreat which will leave them ultimately in a more secure position. Ambassador Rurarz's experience with the sorts of deception capable within a Communist state might well lead us to think again about what is actually happening in Eastern Europe.

Jennifer White, former Senior Minority Staff Consultant to the House Foreign Affairs Committee and currently a Senior Associate at the Center for Security Policy, analyzes whether the international community is over-reacting to Gorbachev's thus-far limited program of reform. Her assessment, titled "Perestroika and Western Dollars: The Continuity of Ends," suggests that the Soviets may have implemented a clever strategy designed to acquire hard currency and Western technology which, if successful, may impede real economic reform.

South African Rabbi David Lapin takes the highly emotional issues of U.S. sanctions against South Africa and places them in a more easily understandable context—one with a more human face. This article, "South Africa's Need for Creative Instruction," appeals for the development of consistent ethical principles in current U.S.-South African relations rather than strident political rhetoric.

Finally three book reviews round out this *IFR*. Richard Sincere's analysis of Walter Williams' book, "South Africa's War Against Capitalism," discusses how apartheid is a form of "ethnic socialism" and shatters the myth of exploitive capitalism. Adam Breeze analyzes aspects of another myth—which makes American citizens wittingly and unwittingly supportive of Irish terrorist organizations—in Jack Holland's book, "The American Connection." Finally, James Skinner studies Dr. G.W. Sand's latest salvo in the Nicaraguan policy debate, titled "Soviet Aims in Central America: The Case of Nicaragua."

Joseph J. Gimenez III
Editor

Ambassador Juan Sosa

CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION OF PANAMA

In the early morning hours of December 20, 1989, United States military forces began operations culminating in the overthrow of Panamanian General Manuel Antonio Noriega. A repressive dictator now under U.S. custody on federal drug-trafficking charges, Noriega had controlled Panama through fear, intimidation, and human rights abuses on a scale never before seen in Panama's history. Although costly in American and Panamanian lives, and in terms of material losses—including the systematic looting of commercial sectors—the liberation of Panama allows the new government to rebuild the institutions of the country and embark on a program of economic reconstruction. The tasks which the new government faces are difficult, and even dangerous, given the chaotic state of the economy, the high unemployment rate, and the limited resources the new government has at its disposal.

Early Relief Provided by Frozen Funds

Former President Eric A. Delvalle, acting underground through his Embassy in Washington, initiated actions in March 1988 to freeze assets in the United States belonging to the Republic of Panama. This action was later formalized in April 1988 when President Ronald Reagan signed an executive order denying Noriega's regime access to those funds in existence, and those

Juan B. Sosa came to Washington, D.C. in October 1987 as Ambassador of Panama to the White House representing the Government of President Delvalle. In February of 1988 he denounced General Manuel Noriega's ousting of President Delvalle and led a coalition of forces in the United States in the fight to overthrow the dictatorial regime of Noriega. He continued to be recognized by the United States as the legitimate Ambassador of Panama and served until August 1989 upon termination of President Delvalle's constitutional mandate. In the ensuing months, Ambassador Sosa continued involvements toward the ousting of Noriega. Sosa has served as President of the American Chamber of Commerce of Panama, as Vice-President of the Board of Advisors of Nova University, and as Chairman of International Relations of the Republican party of Panama. Ambassador Sosa is a graduate in Business Administration from the University of Oklahoma.

must present bold initiatives, encourage honest and civilized debate, and respect only those views borne out of justice, dignity, and liberty. They must be careful not to be foiled by ulterior plans and the folly of political expediency. Only then can Panamanians walk united toward a true national reconciliation, the reconstruction of their proud country, and secure peace and prosperity for all.

IS COMMUNISM DEAD IN POLAND?

Poland, the first of the Soviet client-states to historically shrug off Moscow, now seems committed to painful introduction of the free market in the brutal process of privatizing its formerly socialist economy. Poland might also be the first of the so-called former Soviet-bloc states to return to the fold of traditional Communism and to do away, utterly and completely, with the possibility of reform.

On the other hand, if all goes as planned, less than three years from now completely free parliamentary elections will be held. In the meantime, the once-ruling Communist party, known as the Polish United Workers' Party (*Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza*, or PZPR) will have not only been deprived of its so-called "leading role" in the country, but changed its name, and even split into two parties, one softer in ideology than the other as the principal difference and their membership may be greatly reduced.¹ Other political parties will probably operate freely. Or, might I say, as freely as possible when one allows for the extensive Soviet infiltration which has occurred since 1944-45 in all walks

1. It is somewhat difficult to discuss, believably, two Communist parties, as indeed this is oxymoronic given the traditional understanding of Communism's "one-party" tradition. For the sake of simplification in this argument, the delineation of the two Communist

Zdzislaw M. Rurarz served as Poland's Ambassador to Japan in 1981 and in November of that year he was nominated to a concurrent Ambassadorship to the Philippines, though he did not assume that appointment. In protest of the declaration of martial law in Poland in December 1981, Ambassador Rurarz and his family sought and were granted political asylum in the United States. Rurarz served as Economic Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Warsaw from 1976 to 1981. He was special advisor to the Secretary General of the UN Conference on Trade and Development in Geneva, Switzerland from 1973 to 1976. He also served as Economic Advisor to the General Secretary of the Polish Communist Party, Edward Gierek, from 1971 to 1972.

of life. These are truly breath-taking changes, but in the sense that use of "breath-taking" may be more optimistic than the true, somewhat more skeptical sense which events warrant.

What might follow in these formative weeks and months for a formerly Soviet-dominated state? Will Solidarity lead Poland out of its economic crisis? Or, will Solidarity fall flat on its face in the eyes of a Polish people already desperate for drastic economic recovery, for the simple need of putting food on the table? Only time will tell the answers to questions such as these, but there are disturbing elements deeply embedded in the Polish political system which warrant attention from Western observers, especially those entering the new debates over actual and possible changes in all Eastern Europe.

The events of 1989, in Poland and in other Eastern European countries, seem influenced, or even directly instigated, by certain as-yet-not-too-clear developments emanating from the Soviet Union. Those developments result partially from the deep crisis which the whole Soviet system is experiencing and partially from the Kremlin's deliberate policies, i.e., increased efforts to wreck NATO and the European Community. The "German card" which has been played by the Kremlin clearly echoes such efforts. Certain mysteries in Poland and Eastern Europe—as to what exactly happened and what will happen—remain.

The Roots of Change

The Communist system imposed on Poland after World War II was totally alien to Polish traditions and met with considerable resistance, often armed. Such protests, later becoming mostly economic in nature and spearheaded by blue-collar workers, were always "self-restraining revolutions"—the "shadow of Soviet tanks" set the limits. Despite their seeming futility, the Poles did not resign from periodic protests, even when they resulted in bloodshed. Such protests were not in vain; certain limited goals were always achieved.

parties which have emerged will be an understood implication of the descriptive "Communist party" or "the Party." The real differences are only in the popular bases they are attracting and the small idiosyncracies in ideological platforms.

In Poland, the wave of strikes which led to the birth of Solidarity in the summer of 1980 was such a "self-restraining revolution"—bloodless—different in that this protest movement became exceptionally massive in popular support and well organized. Due mostly to Soviet pressure, Solidarity was squelched by Warsaw's imposition of martial law on December 13, 1981. Remarkably, Solidarity did not totally collapse; it went underground. Unlike previous resistance movements, Solidarity remained faithful to its commitment of rejecting violence as a means of struggle, instead opting for evolution and not revolution.

Whether Solidarity would have survived had it not been for the dramatic changes in the Soviet Union is debatable. The winds of change which followed the ascension to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in March 1985 resulted in a relaxation of repressions throughout the Soviet bloc, Poland first and foremost. Gorbachev himself, during his July 1987 visit to Poland, gave the Polish Communist party a green light to seek "compromise" with the opposition, an idea which they had previously considered. Had this not occurred the opposition would not have had the strength to force the regime into concessions, nor would the regime have gone far in conceding conciliatory gestures.

If anything distinguishes Poland and Hungary from other Eastern European countries it is that their government leaders became attuned to Gorbachev-inspired "new thinking" — unlike East Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, or Romania. The Kremlin has managed, quite cleverly, to stage the known upheavals. The Kremlin, all covert interference aside, also meddles "legally" in these countries. For example, Poland's Constitution, similar to other Soviet-dominated Eastern European countries, commits it to "friendly" terms with the Soviet Union. Moscow judges the meaning of that commitment.

Soviet Hegemony in the Midst of Change

The experiments in Poland, Hungary, and other Eastern European nations are very unstable: should the USSR change its policy course, i.e., should Gorbachev or his successor recommit the Soviet Union to orthodox Marxist-Leninism, or the Brezhnev Doctrine, all such experiments would end. Since it is unlikely that the USSR will become a truly democratic country, drastic change

might only lead to a neo-Stalinism of sorts. Unfortunately, in Poland and other Eastern European countries now reforming, a return to old times could also be widely acclaimed, as the hardships of economic reforms are increasingly criticized. It must be

The military controls several industrial enterprises; it is heavily represented, overtly and covertly, throughout many walks of life.

remembered that Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe is the determining factor of all ultimate outcomes.

The power structure in Soviet-dominated countries is similar in all Communist countries as the Communist powers had traditionally four basic pillars of strength: the Communist party (whatever its chameleon-like official name or names), the State civilian apparatus, the armed forces, and the police, especially political police. Their relative importance may vary in time and place, but if any true democratization of Poland and Eastern Europe is to succeed, one must ceaselessly watch how these four pillars are dismantled by the opposition forces. If these are not dismantled properly and completely, they will continue to obfuscate the pursuit of true freedom.

Though the pivotal role of the former 2.2 million strong PZPR seems to have somewhat diminished, it remains powerful. Communist-controlled "trade unions"—seven million strong and militant—are powerful reserves. As mentioned, the Communist Party has now split and regrouped under new names, the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (SDRP) and its rival, the Social-Democratic Union. Both are perhaps ostensibly preparing for an upcoming counteroffensive, should the situation become favorable for it.

The State civilian apparatus was another stronghold of the Communist party and the two parties allied with it—Communists in shadows. Although the government is now dominated by Solidarity and two allied parties—the former United Peasant Party (ZSL) which was recently renamed the PSL-*Odrodzenie*, meaning

the Polish Peasant Party "Rebirth," and the Democratic Party (SD)—most functionaries in the ministries and other central institutions are still Communists. Moreover, 85 percent of the management of state-owned enterprises are Communists. It has been suggested that state functionaries will soon be prevented by law from belonging to any political parties. If this proposal becomes law in Poland, the Communists can still have unofficial party cells; while the non-Communists, weakly represented in the state apparatus (especially at higher echelons) and never organized politically, may not follow suit. In the end, this will favor the Communists.

The most important position in the country now belongs to the President, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, a Communist (although he says he did not join either of the two recently created Communist parties). Jaruzelski has the power to fire the Premier, dissolve the parliament, and declare martial law. The expanding Presidential Chancellery, headed by General Michal Janiszewski, seems to be becoming ever more powerful than the constitutional government.

President Jaruzelski also has the power to direct internal and external security matters, foreign policy (including ambassadorial nominations), and some economic policies. Four key cabinet posts, after the Solidarity-led government was formed in September 1989, remained in Communist hands: defense, police, foreign economic relations, and transportation. The Chamber of Control and the Central Bank were also given to the Communists. Interestingly, only one of these ministers—the head of the Police force—now claims to belong to the renamed Communist Party

These are exceptionally important posts for both the "new and improved" Communist parties and Soviet interests in Poland as well. For instance, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations is responsible for Polish-Soviet trade, a dominant factor in Poland's foreign trade, and trade in weaponry. Furthermore, it coordinates the country's involvement in the so-called socialist economic integration under the auspices of the Soviet-led Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, known also as COMECON. The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations is also involved in the acquisition of Western high-technology, a preoccupation which usually involves Soviet-coordinated espionage. The Ministry of

Transportation is responsible for all railway, road, air, and internal waterway traffic—of tremendous strategic importance to the Soviets for transit to East Germany.

The military's chief institution, the Ministry of National Defense (MON) plays a special role in Poland, unlike that in most other Communist countries. Almost 350,000 strong (soon to be reduced to some 300,000), with a professional officer corps of 56,000, the army is a formidable force. Nearly all officers and non-commissioned officers were Communists, as are many conscripts. In all, some 120,000 Communists were in active military service. Yet now, again for reasons which are not too clear, all political parties are being banned in the army. The reality of this maneuver can be deceiving. Before 1948, the same situation was created, in which political parties were banned, although everyone knew the leadership of the armed forces belonged to the innermost Communist leadership and clandestine Communist cells existed in the military units. The military controls several industrial enterprises; it is heavily represented, overtly and covertly, throughout many walks of life.

Until recently a highly secret "defense council"—the National Defense Committee (KOK)—existed in Poland, as in all Communist countries. Headed by Jaruzelski, the KOK is *the most important institution in the country*, as it controls the all-inclusive categories of defense and security matters. The KOK answers only to its Chairman.

Even though the membership of the Polish KOK was recently reported, the so-called Military Council (*Rada Wojskowa*) exists at the Ministry of the National Defense, apart from the KOK. Unlike the KOK to which civilians and Solidarity members such as Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki belong, this Council is composed exclusively of military professionals, including General Jaruzelski, and can interfere in political affairs. In June 1989, the Military Council stated that only those familiar with Poland's defense needs and having the support of the military could be elected President!

In Poland, the military-controlled civil defense has, under certain conditions, vast prerogatives. All citizens must follow its directives. Together with the possibility of instant militarization of

certain institutions, as was the case during the martial law period, the whole country can be easily put on a war footing with all civil rights suspended.

Poland is a Warsaw Pact member, thus closely tying the Polish military to its Soviet counterpart. The integrated command structure of the Warsaw Pact subordinates non-Soviet armies to the Soviet Army and Fleet. Thus, the Polish Army is under the Soviet Supreme Command, operationally belonging to the Soviet Western War Theatre, headquartered in Minsk, Soviet Byelorussia. The Polish Army is also a so-called coalition army, meaning that it is profoundly integrated with the Soviet armed forces and, as such, is not capable of conducting independent war operations, especially not against the Soviets.

Practically all Polish senior officers—roughly half of the officer corps—are graduates of Soviet military academies, including the Academy of the General Staff. It is believed that many of these graduates are recruited by Soviet Secret Services and placed in key posts. Since Polish counterintelligence and intelligence services are strictly forbidden to conduct any operations against the USSR, such "Soviet connections" are not only unpunishable but actually not even fully ascertained.

No Polish senior officer could seriously contemplate military confrontation with the USSR as there would not be the slightest chance of winning. Should a Polish officer have the choice between doing away with anti-Soviet, and anti-Communist opposition, or risking a head-on collision with Moscow, he would most probably grudgingly, choose the lesser evil of doing away with the opposition.

The police force of the Ministry of Internal Affairs is the fourth pillar of the power structure. In Poland, the police force is a combined unit of both the political and regular police together with the border and internal troops. Precise data as to the strength of this force does not exist as agents and informers operate clandestinely.

The Polish equivalent of the KGB is known as the SB, but now operates in three different units. One such unit, the Department of the Constitution's and State Order's Protection, is the direct successor of the old SB. That service, once almost 10,000 strong,

excluding agents and informers, is said to be reduced now by one-third, but this should be doubted. Many SB functionaries have simply been transferred to other police jobs and continue their past activities under cover.

To truly effect a change of significant outcome, Solidarity and all other non-Communist organizations must firmly establish their programs of action.

The MSW is the equivalent of a combination of the Soviet KGB and its sister organization, known as the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). The MSW and its SB is not any less powerful than the KGB: it is involved in intelligence and counter-intelligence activities in addition to ordinary police and militarized police operations. The SB is the proverbial state within the state, composed almost entirely of Communists, although they may not reveal their political affiliations. Unlike Communists in the Polish Army who were less exposed to various "hostile activities" in the country, the SB are devout Communist die-hards and "black characters." Due to the fact that a limited civil war was fought in postwar Poland and repressions were fierce, the SB has a bad reputation and is commonly hated. The SB would be the least likely institution to capitulate to non-Communists since many of its functionaries would probably face the justice of a lynch mob. The police also have a close connection with their Soviet counterparts and it is believed that the SB is heavily infiltrated with KGB.

These structures are formidable roadblocks for true Western democracy. Some two million, mostly adult men²—many of them armed, experienced, well organized, and Soviet-allied—are clearly a force to reckon with. Although some dissidence in the ranks may not be totally ruled out, it would be safer to assume—as the experience of martial law demonstrated—that this force may deal

2. This number reflects old statistics and, although the numbers remain large, no precise statistics are available at this time.

a deadly blow to democratic forces in Poland, should there be the decision to use it.

Democratic Forces: Diversity and Factionalism

Until very recently the forces promoting democracy and full sovereignty in Poland came most prominently from Solidarity, from its widely divergent urban and rural groups. The once ten million strong Solidarity and the over 2.5 million strong Rural Solidarity have greatly reduced their numbers at present. At the time of this writing the "Urban" Solidarity has only about 2 million members. Nobody knows the exact numbers of Rural Solidarity now as it also evolves into various political parties, but they are nowhere close to pre-martial law Rural Solidarity. Besides, the newly-founded Polish Peasant Party (PSL)—once the biggest political party from 1945 to 1947—is clearly at odds with Rural Solidarity, as the latter has tried to be the "PSL" party, failed and founded the rival PSL-Solidarity party.³

"Urban" Solidarity is split and more splits loom on the horizon. The parallel Citizens' Committees (KO) and Parliamentary Citizens' Committee (OKP), although sponsored by Solidarity, are not necessarily Solidarity subsidiaries. Solidarity is financially poor—most of its members do not pay dues—and hardly popular among the younger generation. The leadership of Solidarity was either elected long ago (Lech Walesa was elected to his present post in October 1981) or not at all. Solidarity is seemingly ruled in a dictatorial manner, and Lech Walesa makes many decisions single-handedly. Solidarity faces identity crises, because it is neither strictly understood as a trade union, or a political movement, and much less as a political party. Besides, neither of the two Solidarities is now a true opposition movement. The two Solidarities were once mass protest movements, a truly peaceful revolution, and popular even among Communists, one million of whom—one-third of the party—joined their ranks. Today, this is no longer true as they have joined the government. Solidarity

3. The third peasant party, also PSL but named PSL-Odrodzenie (PSL-Rebirth), was formed by the already mentioned ZSL, once Communist affiliated, and then later Solidarity-affiliated. It is by far numerically stronger than the other two.

suffers a severe identity crisis and no one knows how it will evolve in the future.⁴

To truly effect a significant change, Solidarity and all other non-Communist organizations must firmly establish their programs of action. The rapidly deteriorating economic and social situation in Poland is reaching the point where the non-Communists may be blamed by the populace, perhaps even violently, for Poland's various woes.

While neither of the two Solidarities is a political party (even though Rural Solidarity has tried to evolve as such, as mentioned above) no other viable, powerful bodies—apart from the splintered Communist party and those earlier allied to it—are emerging. Even though the PZPR seemed to have turned power over to Solidarity, the leaders of the new Polish government were unprepared for the task and greatly improvised. Solidarity could hardly imagine they would ever be in a position to even consider drawing up contingency plans for such a situation.⁵ Dozens of political parties and various organizations exist now—more are in the making—but, unfortunately, all have rather tiny memberships and hardly-appealing programs. Besides, formally speaking, no legislation currently exists to constitutionally protect the existence of political parties other than those established in the past. Such legislation has been proposed but it remains to be seen if it will take hold. The people of Poland do not have the leisure for politics when they must worry over how to buy food increasingly put out of reach by prohibitive prices.

A paradoxical situation of ill-omen has developed in Poland, as evidenced by data released after January 1, 1990. The long lines for food and commodities have disappeared, not because of a new abundance, but rather because the prices of all such items have risen much faster than incomes. Production has fallen too.⁶ The

4. In late April its Congress will meet to decide what to do next.
5. Out of the twelve cabinet members from the ranks of Solidarity, five are former Communists and this is not viewed favorably by the non-Communists.
6. In the first two months of 1990, after the Solidarity-designed economic reform was introduced, prices rose more than 100 percent, while real wages dropped by almost 40 percent and production fell by more than 30 percent. The standard of living fell 40 percent as well.

August 1, 1989 implementation of a free market in food has failed to stimulate agricultural production; industrial production has also become worse. No one knows when either of the two will turn around. How can things turn around for an increase in private initiative as taxes continue to rise and thus the incentives for entrepreneurial ventures are taken away? In fact, many private businesses are closing, while the farmers, especially smaller ones, are more hard-pressed than ever.

Most discouragingly, as a result of this Catch 22 situation and PZPR mismanagement of Poland for forty years, it seems that the Polish people are fed up with politics. Having heard the word "Party" for decades, they detest the mere mention of the word alone. The other parties do not help their own cause. Demonstratively, as previously mentioned, there are three peasant political parties, each named PSL, with two of them adding their orientative names within quotation marks. It is all very confusing; attempts to simplify the situation, as the Western press does all too often, worsens the effectiveness of response.

The younger generation has been particularly alienated from a constructive political spectrum and, in bleak prophesy for Poland's future, avoids joining any party. Instead, the youth seem attracted to anarchistic slogans, as vividly demonstrated in the streets of Warsaw in early January when young anarchists broke windows in the parliament, Communist party headquarters, and Solidarity headquarters. Lech Walesa's own eighteen year-old son has refused to join Solidarity and dispassionately calls his father an ideologue. Moreover, there are some indications that old-Bolshevik and anti-Church attitudes are appealing to the young people now, though such movements have not become large enough to worry about. The threat will be there all the same.

The dissipation of the Polish people in these directions is most likely caused by the fact that the democratic forces in Poland lack any convincing blueprint on how to redress, as quickly as possible, the economic situation. The first actions by the Solidarity-led government demonstrated inconsistencies and contradictions with its earlier attitudes. Contrary to past vows, Solidarity could not find first-class experts to staff important posts in the government. Those who were found had no fresh ideas or knowledge on how to run the various businesses entrusted to them. The

economic program finally presented to the Sejm, the lower house of the Polish Parliament, by Vice Premier and Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz was a headlong rush of free market extremism. Although these measures may be the necessary antidote for the

It is believed that the Soviets have stored pre-positioned equipment in Poland which could supply five more divisions.

socialist failure, the hardships produced in the short-term will hardly be seen as proficient handling of government. The sense of incompetence, once blamed by the Poles on Communists, continues upon Solidarity and the other parties.

The democratic forces, primarily in Solidarity, are committed to market-oriented reforms. This is ironic, and possibly self-deluding, because Solidarity's power base is in the big factories, the coal and copper mines: generally, the blue collar workers. Although this power base is anti-Communist it still wants to preserve inherited concessions, like job security, won under the centrally-planned economic system. Free market reforms inherently threaten such institutions. According to various estimates one-third of the Polish workforce may become jobless—this is more than five million people. Paradoxically, those who support Solidarity the most may soon be jobless.

Privatizing the economy faces real hurdles. Who will be the beneficiaries? How will privatization be done? The impoverished society seems unprepared to tolerate new social inequalities. As it is now, twenty percent of the Polish population is below the poverty line while forty percent teeter on the brink. Foreign capital can perhaps be tolerated but "native capitalists" are not too well envisaged.

"Urban" Solidarity has split along "us" and "them" lines: those in factories and mines and those in government and parliament. The old divisions between rulers and ruled seem to have returned. Solidarity activists in the power center have little time for contacts with their grassroots power base. Ominously for the leaders, the

powerful Catholic Church, which during the martial law period extended its helping hand to Solidarity, seems now to be distancing itself from it. In the past, the opposition was always popular for its criticism of its government's dependence on the USSR and its vociferous demands for Soviet admission of the serious crimes committed against the Polish peoples since World War II, especially the 1940 massacre of 15,000 Polish officers in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk and elsewhere. Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika, supported both by Solidarity and the Communists, have made these criticisms less forceful and the power of Solidarity's popular base is becoming somewhat eroded.

The Ever-Present Soviet Troops

Another issue divides the Poles and deeply affects Polish-Soviet relations: the presence of the North Soviet Army Group stationed in western Poland with headquarters at Legnica, Lower Silesia. This army group is composed of two armored divisions and one air army, plus several smaller units deployed throughout the country, including Warsaw. These divisions number approximately 50,000 troops. In addition, it is believed that the Soviets have stored pre-positioned equipment in Poland which could supply five more divisions. Obviously enough, Poland is the main transit country between the USSR and East Germany and is of vital strategic concern to Moscow, unquestionably a major motivating factor in many Polish-Soviet developments.

The presence of Soviets in Poland dates to 1944-45, when some three million troops swept across the land in the World War II thrust for Germany. Later, 300,000 were stationed in Poland, but this number was eventually reduced to the mentioned 50,000. Because of this presence many Polish Communists believe the Soviets are the guarantors of the new Polish western and northern borders which are questioned by some in West Germany—and may one day be questioned by a united Germany.

However, Lech Walesa on January 18 appealed to the USSR to withdraw its troops from Poland. Almost immediately, the spokeswoman of the Solidarity-led government opposed Walesa's position and Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki was particularly angered. More importantly, Jaruzelski similarly positioned himself with Mazowiecki on February 4, thus creating the situation where Jaruzelski and Mazowiecki, the latter originally from Soli-

July⁸ the country was on the brink of another martial law. It must be remembered that the Communists still have the means to reapply their might. In considering the imbroglio in Poland, it might benefit us to consider the possibility of the Communist Party's retreat being a clever tactic in order to deal the deadly blow at the proper time.

In Poland the "military-police complex" is particularly strong, experienced, and secretive: one must be prepared for any surprise.

What next?

Polish developments will be almost totally dependent on Soviet developments. Any separation of the two is impossible. The USSR has not abandoned Communism nor imperial designs. Western-type democracies will not be built in the USSR or any other Soviet bloc country, nor will full sovereignty for former Soviet bloc countries be completely tolerated by the Kremlin. These hard realities are limiting factors for change in Poland and if some changes go too far they may always be reversed.

The Communist party, whatever its names or constitutional prerogatives, will continue its grip on power in Poland, as in any other Communist country—with the possible exception of East Germany should the USSR accept its demise for a higher stake, which is a neutral and demilitarized reunited Germany. Concessions to non-Communists may either be temporary or a clever move to broaden the power structure.

Finally, it might simply be a tactical maneuver to ambush the foe and thoroughly destroy him. The latter probability is particularly tempting. Assuming that this happens one day, Solidarity would never be reborn as no viable alternative movement has emerged in Poland. It is impossible and naive to imagine that the

8. Jaruzelski won by only one vote thanks to several Solidarity parliamentarians who either abstained or did not participate in the vote.

Party or the Kremlin have not considered these possibilities. It is almost certain that both realize this perfectly well, but keep quiet, or even make moves under rubrics of camouflage.

In Poland the "military-police complex" is particularly strong, experienced, and secretive: one must be prepared for any surprise. Since that "complex," and all other Communists, feel offended collectively and individually, that surely increases the temptation for revenge, if the occasion rises. Should this be the case, then the 1981 martial law was, comparatively, a child's play as to what can happen now.