Mr. Yuji Yokoyama
U.S. Bureau Chief
SEKAI NIPPO
1160 National Press Bldg.
Washington, D.C. 20045

Dear Mr. Yokoyama,

Thank you for calling me today and giving me the new address of your Bureau. I am sorry for the misunderstanding, but at one point I truly believed that something went wrong and my cooperation with your paper, the cooperation which I value highly, was terminated. Since this is not the case, and I appreciate your clear stand on this, let's bygones be bygones and return now to our former relationship.

I attach herewith, as I have promised you, a piece which may be of interest to you which, among others, covers also Katyn and the new "Gorbachev doctrine", although no such term is used in the piece.

Once again I thank you for Christmas and New Year greetings and once again I wish you and your family all the best on this occasion.

Cordially yours,

Attan

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December 21, 1988

Dr. Zdzislaw M. Rurarz PO Box 634 Vienna, VA 22180 USA

GORBACHEV'S CLEVER GAME

Gorbachev's offensive to deceive the West has entered a particularly sophisticated phase. Not only has he come out before the UN General Assembly with the announcement that he would cut his armed forces, something hard to verify when and if it really takes place, but he has also made a series of other clever moves.

For example, he initiated a true assault of Western Europe through the "liberalization" of Eastern Europe. Mindful of all the distrust existing in Western Europe, Gorbachev seems to be pulling out the carpet from under the feet of all those Western Europeans for whom the litmus test of overall Soviet policies is their behavior in Eastern Europe. With various odd reforms in Hungary, and even with traditionally Stalinist Czechoslovakia taking a somewhat softer stand on dissidents. Western Europe becomes elated. More importantly, the elation is particularly strengthened because of developments in Poland. Not only did Lech Walesa freely debate on Polish TV with his counterpart, Alfred Miodowicz, the head of the regime-organized "trade unions" and a Politburo member, but he was also let to go to Paris, seven years after his last trip abroad. The hope for unspecified "round table" talks between the regime and Solidarity, still somehow not materializing, and the vague promises to give some role to the latter in the country's affairs, lead the West to believe that the Soviet hold over Eastern Europe is like slowly loosening.

Unfortunately, nothing is further from truth than such hopes.

By creating the impression that Eastern Europe is truly becoming sovereign and democratic, the Soviets capitalize on Western Europe's

desire to lower its guard. True, Gorbachev risks some unpleasantness in Eastern Europe by somewhat loosening his grip on it. But at the same time, such minuses are more than offset by the plusses his policies are scoring. If Western Europe abandons the modernization of US nuclear forces deployed on its territory, scales down its war potential, or even presses the US to reduce its presence on the Old Continent, the plusses for Gorbachev will by far outweigh the mentioned minuses.

Moreover, Western Europe will in the meantime provide him with even still more credits and know-how, which he badly needs.

In such a situation, an allegedly freer and more democratic Eastern Europe must be viewed against the confused and militarily weakened Western Europe, which could also become friendly toward the USSR.

Such a situation would be <u>highly detrimental</u> to Eastern Europe. Its chances of escaping Soviet domination could in fact turn into sinking still <u>deeper</u> in the Soviet mold, an alternative more probable now than ever.

And proof that the Soviets are in no mood to loosen their hold over that sub-continent, is the Soviet attitude toward Poland. Ever since the Gorbachev-Jaruzelski April 21, 1987 declaration, promising among others the removal of "blank spots" in Soviet-Polish relations, the joint commission of historians already met three times with this purpose. The hottest problem here is Katyn where, in the spring of 1940, some 4.2 thou. Polish officers were shot by the Soviets. The Soviets, as known, blamed the Germans in return, saying that the murder took place between September and December 1941, when those Sovietheld Polish officers fell into the German hands after June 1941.

And the Soviets still stick to this version of the event, in spite of all the evidence to the contrary. Moreover, on November 6, 1988, both the Soviet daily Izviestia and Moscow radio in English, reported that the murder in Katyn took place in 1943 when the Soviet offensive approached the "concentration camp" in which the Germans kept the Polish officers. Before they withdrew, they allegedly murdered the inmates.

This particularly odious lie deserves attention. There were only three Soviet offensives in the vicinity of Katyn in 1943, the last of which captured it on September 25, 1943. However, the mass graves in Katyn, found and uncovered by the Germans, were officially made public on April 13, 1943. Before this date, only one Soviet offensive, between March 2-31, 1943, had taken place. Assuming the Germans killed then the Polish officers, a cosmic lie, then how was it possible that their corpses were that much decomposed? Even Soviet forensic experts ruled later, in the special report published in the USSR on January 24, 1944, that the bodies were burried for two years/in fact three years/. Now, without any reference to that report, we have a new lie, by far worse than anything invented under Stalin.

Such ominous Soviet attitudes toward Poland and Eastern Europe, based on deception and lies, should make the West, particularly Western Europe, more vigilant than ever, since they unmask true Soviet intentions.