

'- I pointed this out to Indira Ghandi, but she complained that they had some technical problems. So I tore off the margin of a newspaper and made a technical drawing of a mine. She thanked me. She promised to give it to her engineers so that that they may learn...' Mitreęa perorated seriously.

'- Hey you, son of a gun...' Gierek thrust at him across the table.

'- Oh, that's a trifle...' Mitreęa answered modestly.

In truth, he was not as modest as that. At the time when he talked this nonsense, the Control of the Ministry of Foreign Trade had already discovered some corrupt practices in 'Polcarbon', a Viennese firm, which was partly dependent on Mitreęa. He nearly fired the controllers. I hardly persuaded Szlachcic to prevent him from doing it...

So, after a time, I had had enough of this spectacle, although it were not the above events which had influenced my resignation. It is now time to pass to the main reason, that is my trip to Moscow.

As mentioned, I did not treat my advisorship to Gierek as my personal career. I have never even had such goals in my life. I rather wanted to make sure, for myself, what was possible to be done, especially in gaining a certain independence from Moscow. It was this dependency of the PPR on Moscow that I considered to be the main source of our difficulties.

I had been to Moscow earlier on many occasions. When going to Korea in 1953 and then returning from it in 1954, I even travelled by train through the whole of the USSR. I met with Russians in various parts of the world and in Warsaw. I had quite a good idea about what the PPR was and about the dangers awaiting her, in the future, from the USSR.

Immediately after I became Gierek's advisor, the Soviet Embassy in Warsaw became highly interested in my person. I knew that, sooner or later, I was to go to Moscow on a 'pilgrimage'. All people working at a certain level had to do it. And so, my turn came, too. Somewhere in January 1972, I was called on the Government telephone by Babarin, Economic Minister Councillor of the Soviet Embassy. It was the very same Babarin who, together with Astakhov, prepared the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. He spoke fluent German but did not speak a word of Polish despite his 16 years of assignment in Poland. I once had a major incident with him and he brought it back.

So, I knew something about him. I was also aware of the fact that he spent many weekends with Gierek in Łańsk. It was being said that he was KGB's resident in the PPR. Gierek had to know something because, after all, he did travel with him.

In any case, Babarin invited me to his office in the Torgpredstvo, situa-

at the ALley of the First Polish Army near the Plac Unii Lubelskiej. I was surprised by this invitation. Mostly, it were the Soviets who came to the Central Committee, and not the contrary. I told him that I shall call back. I then went with this affair to Szlachcic, who was already in the CC at that time. He too was surprised, but told me to go to Babarin.

And so, I went. Babarin was very gushing. We drank quite an amount of Armenian cognac and he even presented me with some cheap gifts. The goal of his asking me to come and see him, was to hand me the invitation, to Moscow, for some kind of assemblage organized by the well-known Shitikov. Questions of East-West cooperation in the context of 'world peace' were to be discussed at some forum there. Some other Poles were also to go /this was true/.

The invitation surprised me for this meeting lay outside the sphere of my interests. And, moreover, why did it pass through Babarin? In addition, I was allegedly invited, but the costs of my trip were to be covered by the ... Polish side /Polish Chamber of Foreign Trade/. I therefore answered that I shall think it over, for I must have Gierek's agreement for the trip. Babarin pretended that he understood and that he agreed,

Once again, I went to Szlachcic with this problem /Gierek told me that I should address myself to Szlachcic with organizational questions/.

Szlachcic listened to me and, with emphasis, answered that if Moscow invited me, I should go.

So I went to Moscow in the second half of February 1972. I knew that I was not in the Russians' good books. They only tolerated me. I sometimes had very queer discussions with them and I knew very well what they were about. But I played the fool.

In Moscow, I happened upon a reception in the PPR's embassy. They were decorating, for I don't know what time in the row, some war veterans. Ambassador Zenon Nowak held a speech. I spotted General Henryk Bardziłowski, former Head of General Staff of the Polish Army and I talked with him for a short while. And then, as it was the tradition on such occasions, the drinking bout began. I was weaned from the discussions for Piotr Kostikov, Chief of the Polish Sector of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, wanted to talk with me. I heard a lot about him. It was even said that he was of Polish-Jewish origin, that he came from the regions East to the Bug River and that, during the war, he had remained in hiding in some Catholic refuge. He often came to Poland. Each one of his arrivals shed some panic in the Polish Central Committee. I knew that he was fluent in Polish, that he dressed in Poland and that the Ministry of Interior organized some 'feminine entertainment' for him...

I was introduced to Kostikov. He did not at all have Jewish traits. Simply a blond man growing bald. A red face which proved that he already had a drop too much.

''- What are you doing back there in Poland? The press is making a fuss!'' He said partly in Polski, partly in Russian in a very loud and somewhat upbraiding voice.

I already knew these tricks and was aware that they were aimed at discountenancing people. Very calmly, in Russian, I answered that there was nothing going on in Poland and that I did not know where it was that the press was making a fuss. Kostikov held out. His half drunk monologue went on for minutes. It appeared from it that something had happened in Cracow /almost immediately upon my return from Moscow, I went to Cracow and the First Secretary of the Voivodeship Committee of the PUPP, Klasa, did not know anything/.

''- And, anyway, it's not important''. Kostikov suddenly changed his tone. ''Why don't you drop in to the Central Committee tomorrow? We can chat then.''

He seemed to be completely different and even friendly. I guessed that this was the true reason for my being invited to Moscow.

The next day, in the morning, an embassy car drove me over to the Soviet Central Committee, situated in the vicinity of the Red Square.

A collaborator of Kostikov was waiting for me. But that did not suffice. A uniformed KGB officer needed about 5 minutes to write out a pass for me. The ''SOviet comrades'' were let into the Polish Central Committee without any passes... Yet, here it was different. Finally, I received the pass and went upstairs. Kostikov met me with, I think, the entire staff of the Polish Sector. There were six of them. Some awful ''kukhi'' /cookies/ and Georgian mineral water lay on the table. /I remember its name - ''Borzhomi''/. Tea was brought afterwards.

Our meeting lasted nearly 7 hours! In Polish and in Russian alternately.

I was fully aware that this was an examination and not a talk. Unless it were a masked investigation. They simply wanted to know what I thought about certain things. So, there was a great deal of economic affairs, including the already mentioned Kursk plant which prompted the Katowice steel-mill construction; there was the trade with the West; the integration on the CMEA framework, agriculture, housing construction, transportation, communication and many other questions. They were often irrelevant, such as, for example, the number of Poles who, yearly, visit Western embassies in Warsaw /it was then that I learned that there were 35 thousand such Poles/. In addition, there were such problems as the press, universities, the Church

and I don't know what else. Kostikov left the room several times to talk on the phone, for he did not want me to witness what he was talking about. Once, returning after a call, he said, as a passing remark :

''- There, Johnny /Janek, Szydlak's first name/ Szydlak just called me. He wants to come and take some advice from me...''

I was well oriented that this was meant to impress me. A member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Central Committee of the PUWP wanted to come and visit the Head of the Polish Section of the Soviet Central Committee, who was not even ''elected'' to the central authorities! And there I was, a miserable advisor, bothering him...

I must admit that a funny feeling overwhelmed me. I believed that Kostikov did not invent this telephone call. Oh, I thought, how low have we sank...

Finally, the discussion came to an end. I returned to my hotel. I was allegedly a special guest in the known ''Metropol'' hotel in Moscow, where I even had a reserved table. But I could not get any lunch. I had come too late...

Later, I learned, Kostikov was to say that it would be better if I got out of the Central Committee. He did not like my opinions. He was to state that I was ''slishkom umnyi i khytryi'' /''he's too witty and cunning''/.

When some time later, I was absent during a Politburo debate, Szydlak attacked me for a petty reason. I somehow knew that Kostikov had begun to act. The problem concerned the publication of my letter in the 15th anniversary issue of the magazine ''Rynki Zagraniczne''. The 'crime' was that, to my article, had been added my scientific title /Doctor habilitated/ and my place of work. This, by the way, was done without my knowledge. When hearing this, Gierek, I was told, did not react at all.

I then linked Kostikov's words in the context of Szydlak's visit to Moscow. Szydlak was, moreover, chairman of the Society for Soviet-Polish Friendship. This was not a formal function in the PPR. Even if this was not the true cause, it somehow fit into the logical scheme, according to which Szydlak acted upon orders.

Soon afterwards, Szlachcic also behaved in a rather queer manner. He asked me whether I would like to become Frelek's deputy in economic affairs. Frelek's department was subordinated to Szlachcic, but the economic one was not. It may be that Szlachcic did not have anything bad on mind, but it was obvious that I was being removed from ''under'' Gierek. I answered that I was going to give it a thought and I went to Frelek to ask him what he thought about it. He did not know anything. I then answered that I did not want him to think that I was particular about this ^{rop} position, because

I wanted to leave Gierek's advisorship and the CC, in general. Frelek asked whether he should repeat this to Szlachcic. I agreed. Soon afterwards Szlachcic asked me to come and wanted to know whether all this was true. I confirmed. He did not seem worried or surprised. The only thing he asked me was not to repeat this to Gierek who did not like it when somebody did not want to work with him. He proposed that he himself shall inform Gierek. I don't know how and when he did it, but, after some time, he told me that Gierek agreed. The die was cast...

Still, I continued to meet Gierek and we talked with each other as if nothing had ever occurred. The situation remained like this until the the last days of my work with him. I don't even know what he thought about all this. He has never asked me about it and I did not want to touch upon the subject.

I began looking for a new place of work. I talked with an influential person in the Ministry of Foreign Trade. He was struck by the news and thought I was joking. Without a recommendation from the CC, he told me, I could not await for more than the position of Deputy Director of the Foreign Trade Institute. I agreed...

But the events took a different course. The Third UNCTAD Session in Santiago de Chile was approaching. There was nobody to head the Polish delegation. Formally, it was Stanisław Trepczyński, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was to fulfill this function, but he planned to stay there only several days without even appearing at the debates. Therefore, Ryszard Strzelecki, Gomulka's son^{and} Vice Minister of Foreign Trade, was to go and take over this function. However, he could not stay more than two weeks and the session lasted five weeks. In view of this, Tadeusz Olechowski, then Minister of Foreign Trade and Maritime Economy, proposed that I should take over after Strzelecki's departure. I agreed and so did Gierek. I flew to Chile and it was then that the possibility of working as Special Advisor to the Secretary General of UNCTAD, in this organization's Secretariat in Geneva, opened itself. Trepczyński, who was then present, sent a cable to Warsaw and the affair gained momentum. In January 1973 I left for Geneva and took over my new position.

And still, this is not all.

When in the center of power, one cannot avoid contacts with Soviet diplomats. Receptions in the Soviet embassy are a particular occasion for this. One cannot not attend them, for this is badly viewed. When I used to attend them in Warsaw, the place was always packed and it was completely impossible for an ordinary mortal to get something to drink and to eat. But, there were differences among guests. The most important ones were picked up from the crowded room. And, the most important of the most important were in a sepa-

rate room with the Soviet ambassador.

Therefore, a certain comrade Tsepov sought out the ''second assortment''. I don't know how he knew me and how he managed to find me out in the crowd, but he did and he almost dragged me to another room. The host, here, was Minister-Councillor Loginov, the Deputy of Pilotovich, the Soviet Ambassador to Poland. Loginov seated me at his right hand. The Vice Chairman of the Planning Commission, ministers and representatives of the Central Committee were seated further off.

And then, began the drinking of toasts with Soviet cognacs. They drank themselves blind although I have never seen Loginov reach such a state. The Poles were obliged to drink. The Vice Chairman of the Planning Commission, Jan Chyliński, Bierut's son, and the Minister of Chemical Industry, Jerzy Olszewski /who was later to become Minister of Foreign Trade and Maritime Economy/ were champions in this field. They sang Russian songs and then, completely drunk, were removed from the room like logs.

It was precisely during one of these drinking bouts that Loginov told me, and I was perfectly sober, ''... napisali my v vashe CK shto by vas v OON pierobrosit...'' /''... we wrote to your CC that you should be transferred to the UNO...''/.

So they were the ones who wrote it! I don't know to whom concretely they wrote and I didn't even seek to know. I believed that they could have done it.

Another occasion for controlling the prominents of Peoples' Republic of Poland were, and certainly still are, allegedly '' chance'' discussions. Something like, I was passing by so I dropped in to see you... In my case, I received innumerable visits from Soviet Councillor Anatol Barkovskii /he was to return back to Warsaw just before my departure for Tokyo/. He spoke Polish fluently, was an economist and, what one could call, a bright guy. I could literally not get rid of him. He would supposedly ''drop in'' for 5 minutes, but remained two hours. Others, and this not only in the CC, had similar experiences with the ''Soviet comrades''. The discussions were allegedly simple ones, about nothing. Very quickly however, they transformed themselves into cross examinations or took on the character of an outright dispute or even reproach. I shall yet give a concrete example.

One thing was clear to me: The USSR was master in the PPR. I knew this earlier but, this time, I saw it clearly. Well, it was handled with velvet gloves, but the velvet was of a very bad and gross quality.

Thus began the process which finally led to my resignation from the post of Advisor to Gierek.

In the second half of April 1972, I flew, as mentioned, for nearly one

month to Chile. I saw the growing tensions there. The marches of women drumming on empty pots and pans were already beginning. Huge posters from Fidel Castro's very recent and very long visit still covered the walls. A member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of Chile, whose name I do not remember, told me even that Allende and his socialists were overdoing it and that this was bound to end in a rightist coup. During a reception in the Moneda Palace somebody showed me the generals Pinochet and Prado, as the future possible heads of the military junta... Almeida, Minister of Foreign Affairs, asked to transmit to Gierek the government's of Chile request for PPR's economic aid.

After returning to Warsaw, I repeated ~~this~~^{it} to Gierek but I added that, according to me, there was no use in helping ~~Allende's~~^V government shall not remain long in power. Gierek shared this view.

Anyway, at that time, Gierek had something else on his mind. President Nixon and H.Kissinger were to pay a visit in Warsaw on their way back from Moscow. This was to be the first visit of a U.S.President in Poland. Nixon, it is true, had already visited the PPR in 1959, and I was even among those who had greeted him at the military airport in Bernerów. But at that time, he was vice president. This time, he was the President.

The main subject of the Gierek-Nixon talks was, of course, the giving of credits. The sum of about 600 million dollars was mentioned.

How great was my astonishment when Gierek told me that he shall put forth the sum of ... 3,5 billion dollars! I told him that this was impossible. The USA, in its entire history, had granted such a great loan to one single country - Great Britain. And even this took place after very long negotiations and on not too good terms. I added that I doubted whether the US would want to build Socialism in the PPR...

Gierek, however, did not react to this. The worst thing was that I didn't even know where he had gotten the idea of such a huge sum of money!

The visit took place. I did not participate in the talks. Still, I asked Gierek how the question of credits had proceeded.

'- Well, I told him how much we wanted' Gierek answered.

'- And what did Nixon say?' I asked.

'- Nothing. He nodded.' Gierek replied calmly.

Of course, it never came to any negotiations over such a credit but Gierek probably forgot all about it. Such sums did not mean anything to him...

My advisorship was slowly coming to its end. Yet, I continued to work normally and to find out new occupations. With Gierek, I talked as if nothing had ever happened. I still assisted the Politburo debates and wrote reports. Formally, everything was flawless.

What else can I say? I tried to avoid one thing - making a show of my advisorship to Gierek. Not only did I not appear in the radio, but I did not write anything. My book as well as a textbook for students, which appeared at that time, were written prior to my advisorship to him.

But finally, I decided to write a longer article. And I did this in the 1972 October issue of 'Nowe Drogi'. The article produced a storm and the discussion over it went on even after I had departed for Geneva. Even today, I am being reproached certain things linked with this article.

The whole matter is worth of being discussed. In the article, I suggested an accelerated rate of PPR's growth, putting it at 10 per cent yearly, which corresponded to Japan's growth rate. And this was to last over a long period of time. It is now being said that I had set Gierek on this rate and, therefore, the PPR collapsed.

The background of the article was different though, and its influence upon PPR's development, none. So why did I write like that?

As mentioned earlier, I had no illusions as to the nature of 'Socialist economy'. And yet, everybody who knows the realities of the PPR and other Communist countries, knows very well that the propagation of such views, whether publicly or even privately, does not come into play/in my case, I did the latter currently and the former half-officially/.

I still decided that I should somehow try to bring^{to} peoples' awareness that, even with a 10 per cent yearly growth rate, we should need at least 20 years in order to catch up with the West. But I added that this did not mean that the standard of living would be on the same level. What more, I noted that, until this would occur, the so-called 'demonstrative effects' of the West would be active. This was to mean that Socialism in the PPR would not be popular.

Moreover, I wished for a more rapid growth rate for other reasons. If there were to be no reforms, and I knew that this was precisely the case, this accelerated growth rate would rather quickly reveal the absurdity of the system itself. And then, by its tensions, it shall either force some profound system reforms or provoke a crisis which, too, could lead to some reforms.

I also knew very well that there existed some plans for the construction of a 'Socialist community' and this, particularly after the Bucarest Declaration of August 1971. True, that this did not give big results, but this was not know at the time. A quickly growing PPR, tied to the West by credits and technology was more difficult to be absorbed by this 'community'. And finyll, giving Japan, and not the USSR or other Socialist country, as an example worthy of imitation, had its meaning.

Did I believe in such a growth rate?

In case of favorable internal and external conditions it was possible. The PPR had huge developmental reserves. New age-groups were entering the labor market. Poland is relatively rich in raw materials and fuels and its internal market is rather big. The first developmental barriers had already been overtaken. World economy had some tensions, but nobody foresaw the Middle East War as well as the sharp course of the oil crisis, which was related to this war.

Generally speaking, a 10 per cent annual growth rate was not a rarity in the world and Poland, also, could have been tempted by it. It was her last chance, in the course of this century, to advance to the ranks of highly developed countries. After the marasm of the post-war period development, such hopes were necessary.

Everything, of course, depended here on the changes of the system of economy and not only on changes of functioning. I did not write anything about the necessary changes or was rather advised not to do so by A.Werblan, the then editor of *Nowe Drogi*.

In the article, I also depicted the vision of a 'mass consumption society' with family houses and cars. This was only logical when the national income per capita is higher.

And it is here that I should like to return to Anatol Barkovskii, the already mentioned Councillor of the Soviet embassy and my regular 'visitor'. After having read this article, he came to share his opinion with me. He was astonished why people should have private cars. I then quoted some American research according to which private transportation is cheaper than the organization of communal transportation. Why then, he went on, have family houses? This time, I decided to poke fun at him and quoted another American research... with rats. I explained that the Americans found out that rats living in overcrowded cages are more aggressive than rats living in normally populated ones. There were already many so-called 'ant houses' in Poland, big buildings with a multitude of apartments and a still greater multitude of people. And, I told him, there were already some demonstrations and events precisely in agglomeration centers and not out in the country where people lived in small houses. Barkovskii did not know what to answer.

I should like to digress once more. When taking the post of Gierek's advisor, I had a different conception of the development problem. I wanted to persuade him for a 'zero growth rate' which would last for a year or two, so as to put the economy in order and detect its narrow developmental channels. But somewhere, in my first days of work, I had a long discussion with the late Prof. Witold Trąpczyński, my former superior in the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and then, Chairman of the Planning Commission.

I shared my view with him. He agreed with the principles but dissuaded me from presenting it to Gierek. His point was that, thanks to the accelerated growth rate, Gierek would prove that he was a better man than Gomulka. And, besides, people were waiting for this. Moreover, the production apparatus was set for growth because of the bonus system which, at that time, was in vigor. If it would not have been possible to recompensate it for the loss of this bonus, the "zero growth rate" would not have put anything straight. He persuaded me. The acceleration of the growth rate was inevitable in all cases. And, during several years, it did reach 10 per cent annually, although this was partly on credit.

So, I thought, if things were like that, one had to press the pedal all the way. And then, if the motor begins to break, it will either lead to some major repair or it will all end up in the junkyard.

Well, it did not go for the major repair, but it was close to the junkyard...

I could not have written all this in Nowe Drogi, of course. I left it to the people to read this between the lines. But they read it differently. The vision of the "Japanese growth rate" was adopted. Even Lech Wałęsa, who probably did not read my article, repeated it many years later.

It is here that I could end the description of my advisorship to Gierek. But, I should like to touch upon several things.

The Reader is certainly interested to know whether I had some material advantages during this period.

No, I didn't have any. My salary was identical to the one I had had 2-3 years earlier when working at the Ministry of Foreign Trade, where I was ^{associate} Advisor to the Minister. It is true that I was simultaneously part-time professor at the Department of Foreign Trade of the Main School of Planning and Statistics, but I would have held that post independently of my place of work.

I still had the same apartment, received ^{through} the Ministry of Foreign Trade in 1960. It was a two room and kitchen apartment with a total surface of 46,5 square meters and was situated on the third floor of the Rapperswilska Street number 11 at Saska Kępa in Warsaw. I came out with a request for a larger apartment, but when the affair was already on good tracks, I backed out. I already knew then that I was going back to Geneva, to the UNO and that, thanks to my high salary there, I would be able to buy myself an apartment. And that was what happened. After my return from Switzerland, and thanks to big savings, I was able to build a house for two families. It is situated at the number 23 of Wernyhory Street in Warsaw. It was confiscated after my defection.

I did not receive, and did not want to, a car bonus. I bought a used

VW 'beetle' from a friend and that was our car. Once, my wife and daughter, and another time, all the three of us, passed our holiday in vacation centers of the Bureau of the Cabinet. Each time, we paid the full price, which was nearly as high as that of Orbis /the state owned travel bureau/.

Even though, I did go abroad, my trips were not paid by the Central Committee. Besides having been, as mentioned, to Moscow /paid by the Polish Chamber of Foreign Trade/, I was in Chile, once again in Moscow and in Geneva. The last three trips were at the charge of the Ministry of Foreign Trade.

I had no other privileges and did not want to have any.

But I would like to mention two more things.

The first, concerns general reflections about the experience I had acquired as Gierek's Advisor.

As a matter of fact, I cannot limit these reflections solely to the period of my advisorship. It just happened that I knew more or less all the First Secretaries of the Polish Workers' Party and the Polish United Workers' Party. Already as ambassador, I had talks with Kania /in February and June '81/ and with Jaruzelski/ also in June 1981/. I had known them both previously.

I also knew well, or not so well, all the other personalities of post war Poland. I even personally met the Pope, as well as Lech Wałęsa and other 'Solidarity' activists.

From September 20, 1945 I was member of the Fighting Youth Union and, from August 24, 1946, member of the Polish Workers' Party. I joined the former at the age of 15 and a half years of age. Although I gave the reasons earlier in this chapter, I still do not understand many things. Well, I was young...

In any case, when coming to Gierek as his Advisor, I already had a lot of life experience. My knowledge of the world was quite good. With the exception of Australia, I had been on all the continents. In some of the countries, such as the US, Korea and Switzerland, I spent a longer time. All my school and university diplomas were acquired by normal means. The same concerned my doctorate and my doctorate habilitated. I have worked a lot on myself and wanted to live in the PPR. I was aware of the system's nature, but my wish was to change it and remain in the country.

Unfortunately, I could not do anything. I am far from clearing Gierek, Jaroszewicz and others, from blame, but I want to ask something : What did people like Jaruzelski, Olszowski and their like, do?

I already mentioned that Jaruzelski opened his mouth only once during a Politburo debate. The second time, he reported the Hindu-Pakistani war, on the occasion of the creation of Bangladesh. I have never heard him speak

again.

Olszowski spoke only once. That was when the already mentioned telephone problem was discussed. He had then proposed to furnish every apartment building with portable telephone centrals. He was never more to be heard.

Today, others are guilty, whereas they, are innocent... One must totally lack honor and character in order to say such things. The whole of the United Workers' Party is guilty, and the higher in hierarchy one climbs, the greater the guilt. And there is no use in justifying anyone.

It is more than certain that, had the outcome of World War II been different, no Communist Party would have ever been able to come to power in Poland. Whether through elections or through a coup. However, it did come to power. Many people, and I myself among them, would not have, in different conditions, joined the Communist Party. Other people took over the power. One should not be surprised. If, from a portion of Germany, it was possible to create a 'Socialist German state' which, moreover, claims it is giving birth to a 'German Democratic Republic Nation', so everywhere where the Red Army set foot, satellite countries popped up.

But there exist different ways of being a satellite. There are also various ways of being a Communist. There exist, somewhere, inviolable frontiers of tolerance.

Gierek, Jaroszewicz and others were not only representatives of foreign power, but also of a new class which feathered its nest with privileges. And still, it wanted to identify itself with the Nation. Gierek wanted to be 'leader of the Nation', the PUWP was to be 'the Nation's Party'. It is not important what they wanted. What is important is the Nation's decision. Post-Yalta Poland is an artificial creation. This artificiality had to reveal itself in full. And it did.

Was Gierek a bad person? I think that, after all, he was not. But neither Louis the 16th nor Marie Antoinette nor Nicholas the 2nd were bad people. Revolutions have their laws and their logic. It can be practically grasped through a mathematical model.

The luck of the Polish revolution was that it was a peaceful one. A historical occasion for 'PUWP's reconciliation with the Nation' appeared on the horizon. Many people seized this occasion. Gierek would have probably been treated in a more humane manner, by this Polish revolution, than by some Jaruzelskis and their Moscovite mandataries. For the latter cannot forgive him for the fact that he had 'spoiled Poland'.

Putting him on trial by the junta is as far away from justice as trying Kuroń, Jurczyk and others. Maybe, they will not put him on trial. Personally, I would regret this. If Gierek preserved some remains of honor it would be

quite a show. Nobody could accuse the absurdity of the system and of the Soviet imperialism, as well as he. Unless, he has totally lost his sense of honor, or that the trial shall never take place.

My second reflection is, in truth, a question - Why, if I write all this, have I waited so long?

It is true that I had the idea of breaking with all this after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, but I did not realize my idea. Three days after the intervention I went to Geneva. The West was dumbfounded but did not react. It pretended that nothing had happened and it feared the USSR. Only one of the Russians whom I knew lamented : ''Vot zhalko shto Tchekhy nie soprotivlilis. Ubiliby my ikh milion ili dva i pakanchali dielo...'' / ''Oh, that's a pity that the Czechs did not oppose themselves. We would have killed a million or two and have ended so the job''.../

And then, on January 4, 1973, I drove with my family into West Germany, why did I not ask for political asylum and shout that Gierek's ''economic miracle'' is no miracle at all?

Well, I knew only too well the realities of the world, then. After my arrival to Geneva, various Western economists from the UN, proposed to me, several times, chatty lectures in the Economic Club, about PPR's economic successes. I refused each time. Nobody, even in the circles of specialists, would have believed that this alleged success was not a success at all.

When in June 1976 it was time to return to Warsaw, I returned. I would then tell my wife, and not only her, that all this was bound to collapse. But what was there to do? The West was completely absorbed by the ''energy crisis'', the monetary crisis and the deteriorating situation of the market. The United States were heeling their wounds after the defeat in Indochina and after Watergate. Détente was in full swing. So was Ostpolitik. And Sonnenfeldt's doctrine was noz unknown to me.

Had I asked for asylum at that time, people would have treated me as nearly mentally ill. Already in 1979 or in 1980, just several months prior to the strikes, I could not explain to certain Western economists and journalists that everything was collapsing...

I wanted to live in Poland. Even in Gierek's Poland, the one which was plunging deep into the crisis. But it was still Poland... I was building my house, but still, I did not believe that, one day, I should live in it. Finally, it is better that I had built it. For, had I only a bank account, it would have been used for purchasing, in the West, equipment for ZOMO. But now, there is a kindergarten in my house.

In my case, I think that there was no better moment for doing what I did than December 23, 1981. It was a way of demonstrating my patriotism when,

as Ambassador of the Peoples' Republic of Poland to Japan, I asked for political asylum, for my family and myself, in the USA.

For me, this was a fundamental question - I did not want to participate in the war against my own Nation. Moreover, I declared my own war against traitors. For that, they condemned me to death in absentia.

Well, we shall yet see who will be this war's victor...

Do I regret having been in the Communist movement, having tried to repair the irreparable?

Frankly speaking, I must say that I do not regret. Resistance in 1945 or later had no chances of success, although it was a good thing that it had existed. This had prolonged certain processes which differentiated Poland from other 'socialist countries'. But the country had to reconstruct itself biologically and materially and await the right moment in order to change the abnormal state of things. I awaited this change in full conscience, I have never doubted that it would come. I also observed the changes throughout the world, changes which predicted qualitative transformations.

To me, it seems beyond any doubt that some developmental trends were brought to a halt. Soviet Communism and imperialism have reached their apogee. They may yet provoke a war, but they shall not overcome all the difficulties which are piling up in front of them. In Poland, they met with shameful repulse. It does not matter that Jaruzelski temporarily controlled the superficial situation in Poland. The Polish revolution still smoulders. Very soon it shall explode with a still brighter flame. For the Polish revolution learned a lot.

Many people will maybe not agree with me, but I think that, in the concrete Polish situation, it was worth trying to act as Wallenrod /1/. I myself tried it. And I do not think that it had been done in vain. I had tried it out even in the very center of power, as Gierek's advisor. I feel no remorse for not having chosen a more tranquil life. My desire was to take risks and I still do, although from another position. I acquired unique experience in the battle that I now conduct. Those who construct bridges have also to prepare plans for their blowing up...

The functioning of the Communist system is, I think, well known to me. So is the Soviet domination in Poland. And, not being able to change them, I will now have to fight against them.

/1/ Konrad Wallenrod is the hero of the poem by Adam Mickiewicz /great Polish Romantic poet; 1798-1855/ entitled 'Konrad Wallenrod'. He was Great Master of the Teutonic Knights Order which was generally detested in Poland. However, he was a patriotic Pole who wanted to undermine the Order's structure from the inside, once he had become the Great Master. Unfortunately, he did not succeed. To behave as Wallenrod is synonym to scheming the ruin of the enemy under the mask of loyalty.

The advisorship to Gierek was, by all standards, a necessary and useful school of life for me. I do not regret this period. This time was not wasted.

And one more thing : do I accuse Gierek?

My frank answer is : no. Not now, that he is in no position to defend himself. It is not in my habits to kick a lying person. That is simple cowardice.

Somebody important tole me once that during the 8th^{PUWP} Congress in February 1980, Suslov, who was present, was to have cried out : ''Treason!!!'' to Gierek, when he had realized that some of the changes in the Politburo had not been previously agreed with Moscow. I thought then that Gierek's days were numbered. His stay in the Crimea was somewhat too long at the time when Poland was agitated by a wave of strikes. I was told that Gierek had not been aware of anything...

I do not know what the truth was. The same concerns the information I had received as to the fact that Gierek had been placed, by force, in the hospital at the Szaserów Street in Warsaw, and that this was the ''reason'' of his resignation.

We shall probably never learn the truth about the things going on behind the scenes. Therefore, we should be very prudent when accepting certain facts as final truth.

In the PPR, this truth is very obscure. Just as it is in any other Communist coutry. It was being said, since long, that Brezhnev had proposed the post of Prime Minister and even the First Secretary of the PUWP to Jaruzelski. And this did become reality, even if the road to it was devious.

Personally, I do not wish Gierek a trial. He is already an elderly man and his health is probably not the best.

But for the sake of History, and for his own, I think it would be good for him. If he has honor, he shall say a lot and this will leak out in spite of closed doors. And I do believe that he shall do so.

In case, however, he has no honor and shall beat his breast and fault the Nation, then, let him go down in Polish history as a national tragedy and a wretched personage. Let us wait and see the outcome of this case.

One thing remains certain, whatever the positive role of the Communist Party in Poland, if ^{such a role} had ever existed, came to an end. The Party was unable to solve anything. I attempted to show this with the concrete example of my Advisorship to Gierek. What was possible to be done and what was not is a controversial issue. No serious attempts to actually do something had been observed. At the most, it was all being talked about. But this was not enough and the Nation has correctly evaluated this in July-August 1980.

And this Nation will have no faith in any other leadership which will stick to beaten tracks. For let us not be deluded - no leadership in the PPR will ever deviate from these tracks.

I do not know whether Gierk wanted to deviate from them or not. If yes, then he did not know how to do it. He already occupies an inglorious place in Polish history. All he can do now is either improve it somewhat or completely worsen it.

C H A P T E R I I I .

To the Japanese.

In the light of what I wrote there should be no doubt that my breach with Communism and Soviet-dominated Poland was not an instantaneous decision. I have never been a devout Communist. However, I cannot say that, at times, I was insensible to its appeals. As long as Mankind is beset with injustice, insufficiency and insecurity, people will be longing for justice, sufficiency and security. Communist slogans promise precisely these three things. Especially that Communism claims to be 'scientific' and thus promises to free people of any worries through a process characterized by some rationality given to it by science. And many people fall into the trap. When it comes to the Poles, as I already mentioned, Communism came to them not by their choice, they did not chose this trap. They were brutally pushed into it. I wanted to believe, no matter how firmly at times, that, as long as there was even the faintest hope that both Communism and Soviet domination in Poland can be somewhat humanized and loosened, my place was in Poland. Moreover, even when in the Communist Party and the Establishment, I wanted to believe in a 'revolution from the top'. Some of the Communist countries, although geographically more advantageously placed than Poland, escaped entirely or to a big extent. Some, like Yugoslavia and Hungary, have even humanized Communism to some extent.

It was thus worth trying as long as possible. Once confined behind bars, one tries to make his cell livable. Especially that neither the whole Polish nation could escape nor oppose the Soviet domination with arms.

But let us return now to Communist ideology. One cannot totally rule out the possibility that, had it been preached in the developed countries of the West, and not in Russia, it might have completely disintegrated or taken a much different course, something like 'Scandinavian Socialism'.

Unfortunately, this is not the case. Lenin's contribution to Marxism was nothing else than the addition of a well thought philosophy of dictatorship, enforced by the disciplined Communist Party. Under the guise of 'proletariat's avantgarde', it created a full-fledged totalitarian system where terror, physical and mental, has been elevated to the main driving force behind the whole rationale of Soviet-style Communism, which was soon to be adopted by most Communist parties and countries.

Lenin's Bolshevik Revolution was not really a revolution. It was rather an anti-democratic counterrevolution. The Bolsheviks were in minority, even

after they took power in November 1917. But thanks to their ruthlessness and unprecedented terror, paradoxically organized by Felix Dzerzhynski, a Polish aristocrat, who was head of Cheka, KGB's predecessor, Lenin's counterrevolution won. So what that it cost millions of lives? Ironically, the three slogans ''Peace to War'', ''Land to the Peasants'' and ''All Power to the Soviets'', by which the Bolsheviks lured the masses, turned exactly into the opposite. The war was prolonged and took the course of a very bloody civil one. At first, the parcelled land of big estates was given to the peasants. But even this was not done everywhere and not always. And then, all, even the land which had formerly belonged to the peasants, was taken from them by the collectivization. Finally, the power did not go to the Soviets, a kind of self-governing councils, but to the Communist Party and its ''sword'', the Cheka.

Later, Stalin perfected Lenin's foundations of modern totalitarian dictatorship. Once again millions of lives were lost, adding to the 7 millions which had already been offered on the ''altar'' of ''scientific Socialism''. ''Collectivization'' and all kinds of purges, which did not spare even the Bolsheviks themselves, gave new outlets to mass terror. Soviet-style Communism became thus the Gospel of the newly emerging Communist creed, known wrongly as Marxist-Leninist philosophy, or ''scientific Socialism''.

Many countries like China, Cambodia, Vietnam, Albania, North Korea and others followed that Soviet pattern very closely. What price did they pay? Millions of lives. Many others do not deviate very much from this pattern and can veer to it at any time. The "real Communism" is rather Stalinism, despite its many shades.

Yet, despite all the historical experience, Communism is not, strangely enough, totally discredited. Neither is its main bastion, the USSR. In a sense, both are successfully thrusting forward.

This is because of the three mentioned ''ins''. Communism may be dead in Poland and in some other countries which are under its yoke. But it is not dead everywhere. In developing countries, where justice is absent or insufficient and where insecurity caused by unemployment and malnutrition is rampant, many people may still be lured by Communism. Especially when their education is low or none.

Such people may be receptive to Communist agitation. And once they fall into its trap, they will never escape its claws. Communism totalitarianism has accumulated a lot of experience in its almost seven decade long existence and knows how to make use of rule once it is won.

But even many people in developed and democratic societies may be falling into the Communist trap. Many may be unhappy with the existing social justi-

ces. As the Soviet dissident-philosopher Alexander Zinoviev rightly says, people have, ingrained in them, some ''communal instinct''. Such instincts favor some kind of egalitarianism and ''communal bonds''. Egalitarianism appeals to many. It is easier to talk about distributing wealth than creating it. In a world living under the threat of a nuclear holocaust, air and water pollution, soil erosion and other kinds of stresses caused by modern-life styles, many people may be simply not sufficiently vigilant to Communist propaganda and Soviet threat. And they long for the said ''communal bonds'' which allegedly settle their insecurities. Certain painful adjustment through which Mankind presently travels, may thus genuinely cause many frustrations there where the above threats may be not only unperceived, but may be actually welcomed as solutions.

In reality, one may not believe in the Soviet threat, as all ''freeze'' and ''peace'' movements in the West clearly suggest. Many simplistic, Communist-advocated ''solutions'' to world ills may also be bought in good faith. Especially, if those solutions are not openly Communist, although inspired and manipulated by the movement.

Several people in the Free World, with basically good intentions and goon natures, can be, at the same time, very much naive. They may even believe that where many failed in creating the ''Communist paradise'', they will succeed. Communism is a special kind of trap. It has many entrances and many anterooms. And many do not realize this.

The Japanese are no exception here. Although it seems unthinkable that Communism could win in Japan through a truly democratic process, it is nevertheless true that it can weaken the resistance to its threats in Japan and throughout the world and particularly to direct Soviet military threat.

I know only too well that it may be pretentious to give any of my advices to the Japanese. Actually, I only wish to openly speak out my mind, hoping that my direct and my indirect message will filter through and make my Japanese Readers reflect.

Japan is a big country in all the possible ^{aspects} territory excepted. She has traditions and her own moral standards by which she judges what she hears and sees. And since, most certainly, Communist ideology and Soviet imperialistic designs are alien to Japanese codes, Japan knows for herself how to pass her verdict on them.

But if, in spite of this, I try to turn the attention of the Japanese to certain things, it is because of the greatest respect and genuine admiration I have towards them. Therefore I would like to share my experiences with my Japanese Readers. Let them judge by themselves what I have to say to them.

My first encounter with Japan took place many years ago. When attending

school in pre war Poland I remember that, in one of our books, we had a story entitled ''Porando Kodomo''. The story was about the Russian Revolution of 1905, which followed the Russo-Japanese war. As a result, a group of Polish orphans, since many Poles lived in Siberia at that time, came somehow to Japan. One of the little girls lost her doll and cried because of this. The Japanese press reported the episode. Immediately, many Japanese rushed to the orphanage with dolls to comfort the little girl.

Thus, my first ''encounter'' with Japan left me with a warm memory, with good feelings for the country and the people. Moreover, as far as my memory goes, I have always heard that the Japanese were valiant and that they were a very hard-working people, clean and very intelligent. ''Country of the rising sun'' it was called and the Japanese women, people said, were very beautiful.

My grandfather was in the Russian army and saw the Japanese on the front. He would tell various stories from that time and I loved to listen to them. He was full of praise for Japanese heroism. Japanese soldiers had an honorable place in my collection of toys, probably because of these stories.

I can also remember hearing radio news and seeing newspaper headlines announcing that Japan was at war with China. Later, I followed closely the events of World War II in the Pacific and read many stories about them. Japan definitely excited my imagination.

In Poland, there have never been any hostile feelings towards the Japanese. The very fact that the Japanese were enemies of the Russians was enough to draw the sympathy of Poles. That feeling was not changed by the Sino-Japanese war or even by the Pacific war. And when Japan was bombed atomically and the USSR had invaded her, there was a lot of uneasiness about that among ordinary people. Japan has never been considered Poland's foe.

Many years later I read about the trip of Józef Piłsudski to Japan in 1905. At that time, he fought for Poland's freedom and sought Japanese help. Although without money, he travelled to Japan. But when he arrived there, the Russo-Japanese war was over. Yet, he was kindly received and even his hotel bills were delicately settled by the Japanese. Afterwards, as Marshal of Poland and her factual ruler, he reimbursed his former Japanese hosts.

Further, I learned that, although Japan was Germany's ally during World War II, Japanese diplomats and journalists were helping the Polish Underground in its war against Germany. This was especially done by facilitating the Underground's communication with the Polish Government-in-exile in London.

This was perhaps something unique during that war and should be better explored. Some fragmentary accounts to this end are not enough.

But, what was the most important here was that I had the knowledge of

these facts. So do many of my compatriots. This inevitably shaped my attitude towards Japan.

Still later, I developed more interest in Japan. It was in Korea that I saw the first Japanese journalists and cameramen. This was in Panmunjon and taegu. Some time after this, I bought a Japanese 35 millimeter camera ''Samoca''. This was still in Korea. When in Tokyo, several years afterwards, I purchased an 8millimeter movie camera ''Yashica''. With both of them, I made many beautiful pictures and films. Unfortunately, when defecting, I lost practically all of them. So, as my Readers can see, my ''encounters'' with Japan went even along such peculiar lines.

I was thus fascinated with the country and its people. I read whatever I could on the subject, whether it was in Korea or Poland or any other country where I happened to be.

It was in Geneva, Switzerland, where I was on a 6 month fellowship program in the first half of 1959, that I had a closer look at Japan. Together with me, there was a Japanese fellow, Kyoshi Takahashi, with whom I later met in Tokyo in October-November 1959. We talked more than once on different subjects. I was amazed at how much he knew about economics and how confident he was about Japan's future.

The same was true of another Japanese, Mr. Ikeda, whose first name I unfortunately forgot. He worked with the GATT Secretariat.

As mentioned, I flew to Japan in October 1959 via London, Beirut, Teheran, New Delhi, Bangkok and Hong-Kong. I attended, in Tokyo, the 15th GATT session during which, Poland's declaration on the ''associate membership'' was being adopted and the so-called Dillon Round launched.

Before I left for Japan, I once again wanted to learn more about the country. And I was even more eager to see everything with my own eyes, check whether the image I had created corresponded to reality. Poland just re-established her diplomatic relations with Japan and I knew well the Polish Ambassador, prof. Tadeusz Żebrowski. I was curious of his opinion about the country. I must admit that, at that time, not all the things I knew about Japan were good. The literature I read, mostly in English, some in Russian and Polish, the films I watched, exposed rather the ferocity of the Sino-Japanese war and of the Pacific war. Some views clearly suggested that World War II was virtually started by the Japanese intervention in China in 1931 and by the Japanese departure from the League of Nations. It was also not very clear to me why Japan had attacked the US in Pearl Harbour in December 1941, instead of attacking the USSR. On the other hand, this latter, would have probably permitted Hitler to win the war and this, in turn, meant certain death for me.

Only much later, when I knew many more facts, I concluded that perhaps, the Pacific War was avoidable, if only President Roosevelt's ultimatum would have been less harsh in tone and conditions. Without Japan's response, as it was, the US would have possibly not been at war with Germany at all. And this, once again, would have meant Hitler's de facto victory.

That was not the end to my dilemmas. Japan's defeat meant Soviet victory. Not only did the USSR strengthen its position in the Far East by taking Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands with the Northern Territories, but it also divided Korea. It was from the Northern part of this latter country that an aggression was launched by Kim-Il-Sung. More importantly, Chinese Communists were helped in gaining control over China thanks to Soviet victory in the Far East.

Thus, Japan's influence on the history of the contemporary world, was more than obvious to me.

So, how did my first encounter with Japan, in the Fall of 1959, go? It was fascinating. At that time, naturally, Japan was not what she became later. But, I could see that the giant was rising to its feet. Life was visibly booming. Ginza was already the center of a big metropolis and could compete with any similar center in any other country. The traffic was dense although mainly composed of "three wheelers" and motorcycles. Sky scrapers were under construction. Shops were full of goods, people rushed frenetically. Everybody was kind and clean. There was no crime. At least, I did not see any although I often returned to my "Imperial", and later "Shiba Park", Hotel late in the night. Restaurants and bars flourished. The food was good and tips did not exist...

My feeling was that Japan was returning to world affairs, but not as a naval and land military power. She had been reduced to her 4 main islands and 3 thousand smaller ones. Her territory was bigger than that of Poland by hardly one fifth, although she had three times that population. At that time already, Japan was set on the course which was later to win the fame of the "Japanese miracle". Being in 70 per cent mountainous, practically without any natural resources, seismically very active and exposed to typhoons, the country did not break even after the defeat of the last World War. On the contrary, people looked happy, though they were of the serious, non-nonsense type. They took on rebuilding their lives as energetically as they had once fought. And one could already see their success.

Japan was thus returning on the world scene. This time, her goods, highly competitive, not only in prices but in quality, flooded the markets. This was a radical change from the pre war times when the reputation of Japanese products was not high.

I remember that even in 1959, when Japan's share in world trade was only a fraction of the subsequent one, she was already feared and some 14 Contracting Parties to the General Agreement were denying her the most-favored-nation treatment, by applying the Article 35 of the Agreement. Already then, Japanese competition was frightening to some.

I thought that these fears were unfair and , later, as Poland's Permanent Representative to GATT, I have always supported Japan's demand to do away with the Article's restrictions or 'voluntary export restrictions' demanded of Japan.

After I left Japan from Haneda, via the North Pole to Europe, my interest in that country did not come to an end. On the contrary. I was more and more interested. Especially that, Japan's presence in the world was stronger from day to day and I was continuously reminded of this fact.

Her development proceeded in leaps. In 15 years, after 1955, with an annual tempo of 10 per cent on the average, Japan became the second largest economy in the non-Communist world. In the field of manufacturing production, she was second after the United States and in front of the Soviet Union.

Most probably, the "Japanese miracle" would have been even stronger, had not the monetary, energy and pollution crises not taken place. They have depressed Japan's growth rate. Still, Japan has fared much better in the era of those crises than almost any other country in the world. She practically "digested" the energy crisis, the reevaluation of the Yen and has successfully initiated the phasing-out of the most polluting and fuel and material-intensive industries. She has also firmly entered the era of "high technology", relying even more on her own scientific research and technological innovations. Training more technicians than even the US, education being, in general more advanced than elsewhere, Japan has a bright future before her. This is the view shared by some experts.

But, I would be dishonest if I said that I saw Japan's future only in rosy colors.

In the previous Chapter I mentioned an article written by me in October 1972 in which I had suggested that the PPR should attain Japan's growth tempo. In spite of this enthusiasm, I am not all the way down certain that Japan's future cannot be blurred by some developments largely independent of her.

It is true that Japan's remarkable growth rate, for many years, the highest in the world, broke the boastful Communist propaganda, according to which it was in the Communist countries that the growth rate was the highest. The "Japanese miracle" put an effective end to that myth.

There was even more than that, There were attempts to follow the "Japa-

nese model'' in some countries such as, the Republic of Korea, Republic of China /Taiwan/, Singapore and Hong-Kong. Others tried to follow later. Had world affairs not been under the oil-shock and other strains, the ''Japanese model'' could have possibly knocked down all fascination with Communist growth formulas.

At any rate, Japan has made a very big contribution to the Fight of Freedom and Democracy against Communist Totalitarianism. And that contribution continues to be valid, although under present conditions, it is perhaps less visible and impressive. Because of the lump in world economy, Japan's growth rate, significantly export-generated, is artificially depressed and thus, less impressive.

But Japan's successes are Japan's worries as well, one has to say fairly. Embracing peace as her policy's main imperative, Japan became a country which is as much powerful economically, as it is vulnerable militarily and even politico-ideologically.

The country is vitally dependent on overseas supplies. Some 600 million tons of various goods enter Japan and only one tenth of that amount leaves Japan. The country simply lives on its external connections. Although only 10 per cent of the country's GNP falls on exports, Japan cannot live without trading. Having almost no oil, natural gas, uranium and only some coal, she is energetically vulnerable, more than most developed countries. Her economy would be absolutely crippled without imported fuels. And their sources of supply are far away and not too certain.

The majority of the country's industries, could not function without foreign iron ore, non-ferrous metals, cotton, wood, rubber, wood and pulp, hides and skins, or raw materials for fertilizers.

The country could be also starving without imported food, covering actually 60 per cent of the domestic demand for it.

What more, Japan's dependence on imports has a very special physical configuration. Everything comes by sea. Japanese ports are within striking distance by Soviet and North Korean Air Forces, not saying about the missiles. Should China become hostile, the above could become even more threatening.

Even more disturbing are Japan's sea-lanes. Not only is the proximity of Soviet and North Korean ^{naval} forces menacing. The situation became more serious after the Soviets had established their naval and air bases in Vietnam. This makes Japan virtually surrounded by Soviet naval forces, whose submarines are particularly dangerous. If the Soviets add more and bigger aircraft carriers to that force, the situation will be even bleaker. Should Communist China return one day to amicability with the USSR, and one cannot totally rule out such an eventuality, the situation will become even more alarming.

With Vietnam threatening Thailand, Malaysia and, some day, Singapore, and with not too stable countries such as the Philippines and Indonesia, Japan's encirclement cannot be lightly taken. Moreover, Japan's vulnerability extends as far as the Persian Gulf, the Horn of Africa and Central America, particularly because of the Panama Canal, not saying that Japanese direct and portofolio investments in developing countries are exposed to risks.

Right now, it is the US who provides Japan with security, The US Navy, in the high seas, and the US forces, whether in Japan or in the Republic of Korea, play the role of a shield. For the time being, at least. They are now quite dangerously outnumbered and operationally in a much more disadvantageous situation than earlier, if only because of Soviet bases in Vietnam, South Yemen, Ethiopia and, soon perhaps, in Central America.

It is not my intention to enter into some details here. They are well-known in Japan. And even more may soon be known. Japan has many first-class experts on defense problems and it is they who provide the public opinion with necessary informations.

Neither do I intend to speculate about any particular scenario which would prove Japan's vulnerability. These things, too, are very well known.

Thus, it is not about some purely military matters, strategic and various contingency scenarios that I should like to talk. Japan is a free and democratic country, a country capable of having all expertise it wants in such matters and my taking the floor, here, may sound strangely.

I should like to rpronounce myself on something else.

I am a Pole and, as such, perhaps most impartial in speaking out my mind about Japan. Why impartial?

Well, as I already mentioned, there has always been a lot of sympathy, in Poland, towards Japan. Perhaps, this is due to the distance and the lack of frictions between the two countries. Poland, even in her 'golden age', was never a sea power. For that simple reason, Polish ships did not intrude upon Japan's waters. Later, in the Meiji Era, when Japan was surging forward, Poland was not on the political map of the world and she was licking her wounds after another unsuccessful uprising against Russia in 1863. Though thousands of Poles went to the Far East, close to Japan, they went there as political prisoners deported to Siberia. This was a current practice used with regard to Poles.

However, and this I have also mentioned, Japan's victorious war against Russia raised the hopes of Poles. Once again, in 1905, they revolted against Russian rule and, once more, unsuccessfully, although, this time, they did count some victories. For , Japan's wars, with the exception of the one against Russia, were viewed in Poland with so-

me indifference. During World War II, the Polish Government-in-exile, although officially, the West's ally, restrained from any hostilities between Polish and Japanese forces, though the state of war did exist.

Thus, not a drop of blood has ever been shed between the Poles and the Japanese /with the exception of those Poles who served in the Russian army/. In this sense, the Poles were far more fortunate than the others and this helped shape their attitude towards the Japanese. No hatred obstructed it.

At the same time, the familiarity of Poles with Japan was obviously limited, however sympathetic it might have been.

I myself do not claim to know Japan, despite my twice being there and reading a lot about her. My sojourns were far too short. I could not even start learning the Japanese language, because of the lack of time. Before I left for Japan, there was no time for that. As mentioned in the First Chapter, I was proposed the post of Ambassador only in November 1980 and, early in February of 1981, I left for Japan. In the meantime, I toured Scandinavia and Africa. There was no time to study the difficult Japanese language. And, upon my arrival to Japan, I was too busy, at least, at the beginning. And then came the defection. Besides, I must admit that I was greatly discouraged by the Kandjis. Those of my staff members in the Embassy who spoke Japanese told me that I could speak and write Japanese only after a couple of years. For that reason, I preferred to read on Japan in English and, of course, talk with the Japanese. And somehow, I sensed that my sojourn in Japan would not be long because of the suspicious events in Poland.

Therefore, not speaking Japanese, I cannot claim that I know Japan. And, only 10 months and 10 tens of my ambassadorial duties in Japan were too short a period of time to permit me to speak with any authority about her affairs. But, at the same time, Japan is a country whose presence one can feel without seeing it, or knowing the language. There are ways of acquiring knowledge of this country. I did it through movies, mostly those of Kurosawa and books and articles.

And it is for this reason that I dare address the Japanese. Not only as the former Ambassador of my country to their Motherland, but as a Free Man addressing himself to other Free Men.

The problems I should like to touch upon are rather delicate. I know how sensitive the Japanese are to them. I am aware of their sense of honor and dignity and know how easily their pride may be hurt when others try to be mentor-like with them. Bearing this in mind, I shall be more cautious and not say anything foolish or shallow.

To begin with, I do not agree with the stereotype that Europeans and Americans, especially those who do not know the Japanese, have created of the