

cerned. The way it was pronounced, however, was good. It was quite theatrical.

I met Gierek personally in July 1957 in his Voivodship Committee in Katowice. It was on the occasion of my sojourn in Wisła, where the Central Committee of the PUWP had a center for 'foreign guests'. I stayed there with the representatives of the Communist Parties of Great Britain, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Bulgaria. Although I was already working with the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the Central Committee 'borrowed' me for a period of one month, for I already had a certain experience in this field, having stayed, the previous year, in a similar center in Karpacz. And, moreover, I knew foreign languages.

The reason of my visit to Gierek, in the company of the aforementioned Communists and their wives, also members of the Party /only the Bulgarians left their spouses behind/, were my discussions with them. It was the period following the events of October 1956 and, generally speaking, the PPR had a bad opinion among all Communist parties. She was regarded as revisionist and anti-Soviet. Our guests were simply aggressive. I therefore decided to provoke their discussion with somebody placed higher in the Party hierarchy. Thus, my choice fell on Gierek. It is possible that I had this idea because of Gierek's son, Adam who, quite illegally, stayed at the center. At that time he was a young man of some 20 years of age. Later in his life, he was to become professor. He was sent to the center because the food there was excellent. Even though his behavior was correct, the manageress was scared stiff by him.

And so, I called the Voivodeship Committee and explained to somebody that they should organize a reception of the delegation by Gierek. I gave the reason of this request. I clearly emphasized that it concerned the cooling off of their turbulent spirits. After several days, the visit was confirmed and I was assured that Gierek was bound to remove all their fears.

We went to Katowice. In the building of the Committee I spotted, on the walls, portraits of Julian Leszczyński-Leński executed in Moscow in 1938. That was an agreeable surprise. True that the KPP /Komunistyczna Partia Polski-Polish Communist Party/ and its leaders, executed in Moscow, had already been rehabilitated but, somehow, nobody touched onto the affair. Here, in Katowice, the problem presented itself differently and I noted it as a positive mark for Gierek.

We were effusively greeted by Gierek. He was accompanied by Jan Szydłak who, at that time, was probably Secretary of Propaganda in the Katowice Voivodeship Committee.

Gierek held a fantastic speech, I would say, a nationalistic one. He re-

minded that it was there, in Katowice, that was being forged the strength of Poland, that it was there that were built tanks, cannons and airplanes /this was overblown/. And that, were it not for this force, the Red Army would not have retreated, in October 1956, before an encounter with the Polish Army.

I was flabbergasted. The speech was very much to my liking but it was beside the question! Instead of dispelling the doubts of my guests, he only reinforced them!

When translating the speech into English, I took the liberty of touching it up a bit. I did the same in Russian. But when I wanted to do the same in German, Szydlak, who knew this language perfectly, interrupted me and, outraged, made an exact translation of Gierek's words. A scandal ensued, for one of the guests who was either member or substitute member of the Communist Party of Great Britain /his name was Harry, but I cannot recall his family name/ was, by origin, a German Jew. Since he understood German, he realized, to put it mildly, that he was cheated in the English translation. This time, he translated the true text of Gierek's speech to the other Englishmen and they, indignant, began to leave. Although they did not leave immediately, the atmosphere was spoiled. I was furious at Gierek and Szydlak. My guests, with the exception of the Bulgarians, wanted to leave Poland on the spot. I was afraid that, once in their countries, they would tell incredible tales. I succeeded to take them, on our way back, to Cieszyn and there, over a lunch, they somehow recovered their temper.

So it was 2:1 in Gierek's disfavor.

After this incident, I did not meet Gierek until September 1, 1971 when I paid him a visit in connection with my future advisorship. In 1967 I was supposed to meet him in Katowice to discuss some problems of foreign trade. At that time, I was advisor to the Minister of Foreign Trade. I went to Katowice but, at the last moment, I was received by Tadeusz Pyka, Gierek's Economic Secretary.

At that time, Gierek was being talked about a lot. On the quiet, it was being added that he had 'big ambitions'. It was also rumored that he was a 'good manager', a task much easier to realize in Katowice than in the Białystok province. But still. And then, the greatly exaggerated opinion of 'technocrat' stuck to him.

In 1968, Gierek's authority grew further and he was more and more on peoples' tongues. The March 1968 events were a good occasion for this. It was in Katowice that originated a queer wave of support 'for Comrade Wiesław' /Gomułka, the then First Secretary of the CC of the PZWP/ in face of some closely undisclosed Zionists and other enemies. Gierek himself gave birth to this

wave thanks to his famous speech in which he threatened that 'the clear Silesian waters will break the bones' /presumably of the enemies/. It was also said that, in order to break up a student demonstration in Katowice, he commanded the militia to use trained German shepherd dogs. I cannot for sure attest the truth of this allegation but it is what I was told.

It was during regional manifestations led off by him, as well as in Gomułka's presence at the Palace of Culture and Science in Warsaw, that Gierek's name was heard as that of Gomułka's possible successor.

It was also in another field that Gierek became active. His Katowice Voivodeship Committee of the PUPP collaborated with its Czech counterpart in Moravska Ostrava. It was there that, during a summer manifestation, Gierek delivered an exceptionally dogmatic and aggressive speech reprinted in PPR's central press. Thus, Gierek had some more negative marks.

Another one of those marks was earned when he humbly accepted to be punished by Gomułka who sent him on a visit to East Germany as member of a delegation headed by E. Jaszczuk. Gierek meekly accepted his punishment and accompanied the delegation. A weak character, I thought.

Momentarily, Gierek was not to be heard of. Then, suddenly, came the famous events of December 1970 in Gdańsk. Gomułka lost his position to Gierek. I did not attach any great importance to this change and it didn't even enter my mind that, several months later, my fate would be linked to this man and this, for slightly over one year.

How my advisorship really came about, I do not know for sure. At the time it was taking form, I was, since December 1969, stationed in Geneva in the character of Permanent Representative of the Polish Peoples' Republic to GATT /General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/ and, after the integration of the representations, I further became Deputy of the Permanent Representative of the PPR at the European Quarters of the UN in Geneva.

I was not expecting a return to Poland for I stayed in Geneva for only about half of the normally admitted period. True, that I heard rumors from Warsaw, according to which my name 'was being pronounced in high spheres' but no details were known to me. Back in Poland, some people knew me for my critical opinion of the economic policies of Gomułka and Szydlak. But it was certainly far from having any major significance. In any case, in August 1971, we went, with my wife and daughter, to pass our vacations in Poland. By the same token, I wanted to learn whether I would eventually receive an accord for passing to work in the UN as such. During our stay in Warsaw, I paid a visit to Frerek/Ryszard who, at that time, was head of the Foreign Division of the Central Committee and a rising star. We have known each other for quite a long time, although not closely. I asked him

about a possible consent for my change of work. I had to do this since I was in the so-called Central Committee nomenclatura. Frelek answered that there shall be no such consent for my possible economic advisorship to Gierek was currently under study.

This news caught me completely unaware. He asked me whether I agreed and, after a brief moment of reflection, I answered that, yes. Upon his request I left the address of the place where I was to spend my vacation for, as he said, I was to show up for a meeting with Gierek. I gave the address of the holiday resort of the Ministry of Foreign Trade in Ruciane / in Mazuria, the lake region of Poland / and that was the end of our discussion. Before I left him, however, Frelek explained to me that such a post, as I was to occupy, has never before existed and that no other advisors in any other field were planned.

After coming back home, I shared the news with my wife, Niunia. She was not at all happy. She was not prepared for an untimely return to Poland. And, moreover, the question of our daughter's school was becoming complicated. Besides, my wife did not like the idea of my working in the Central Committee whose building she called 'the old mushroom'.

Maybe, it is worth adding here that, in 1969, I was proposed the post of Deputy Head of the division headed by Kuziński. This division was later to be named economic. The possibility of my subsequently becoming chief of this division was even mentioned. I refused and added that I did not agree with the economic policies of the Party. This nearly shattered my departure for Geneva. Instead, I did depart for Geneva but without receiving the title of minister plenipotentiary, a title held by my predecessor at the same post.

At that time already, and even the more so later on, I had a well established opinion of 'centrally planned economy'. This opinion amounted exactly to the one expressed in 1922 by professor Ludwig von Mises :''... the centrally planned economy is no economy.''

Moreover, nearly one year had elapsed since the events in Gdańsk of December 1970 and I did not have any illusions that everything will take the same course. It was also clear to me that none of the announced reforms would ever see the light of day. Without taking ^{into} account my personal reminiscences of Gierek, I did not believe, any more, in the possibility of r e n o - v a t i n g the PPR. I still lived with the acute souvenir of the intervention in Czechoslovakia, done by the armies of the Warsaw Pact. I did not have the slightest doubt that there was no joking with the USSR. My reasoning was that, the USSR will not agree to any fundamental reforms without which, in reality, the economy of the PPR was unable to exit the period of stagnation.

On the other hand, the proposition of becoming Gierek's economic advisor was a historical chance for me. It gave me the opportunity of testing, to my own cost, what was really to be done in the PPR. It is different to suspect various things and still different to try them out in practice, even if this means disillusionment all along the line. This was the point of view that I exposed to my wife during our walks in the woods surrounding Ruciane. I also explained this to another reasonable person, whose name I do not want to disclose and, he agreed with me.

I actually had no illusions but, I also knew that I would never forgive myself for letting slip a chance of doing something for Poland. For it was for my country and not for the PUWP that I wanted to do something. I did not wish to surrender in advance. To resign without a struggle has never been in my character and I was ready, although without enthusiasm, to take a chance with the adventure which opened itself before me.

My appointment to talk with Gierek was scheduled exactly on the first of September 1971. It took place in the presence of Jerzy Waszczuk who, at that time, was Gierek's personal secretary.

The meeting was held in Gierek's office which was furnished with exceptionally bad taste. There were no two objects which fit together. We greeted each other and sat down, by his desk, in high armchairs resembling airplane seats. They were disposed around a long cocktail table. The desk behind which Gierek normally worked was huge. The windows of his office faced the blank wall of a building contiguous to the Nowy Świat Street / Some time later, he transferred his office and the windows gave on the Museum of Art and its park/.

Physically speaking, Gierek was still imposing. He had his hair shortly cut and his posture was as stiff as a poker. He was energetic and well taken care of. My impression was that he looked better than when I had previously seen him.

Gierek briefly characterized the economic situation of the PPR as 'neglected' and, when saying that, he waved his hand with resignation. This was probably meant to signify that he disapproved of what he inherited from Gomułka...

I, on my side, expressed an opinion which, at that time I did not fully share, that Poland could be a prosperous country since she had all the conditions required.

Gierek visibly liked that. He then formally proposed the advisorship and I accepted without asking for further details, since I knew that Gierek considered the question as closed and it were, as if he hinted that the meeting was over. He only added that I must be officially confirmed by the

Secretariat of the Central Committee. He also gave his consent that, before everything is formally agreed upon, I was to return with my family to Geneva, from where, I was to be summoned by cable. The die was cast.

I flew back to Geneva and did not make it a secret that I would not remain there for a long time, that I was soon to return to Poland where I was to become Gierek's economic advisor. Nobody ever asked me to keep this fact a secret. Even the Permanent Representation of the UUSR in Geneva learned about it, although not from me. Some of its functionaries congratulated me for my new position and gave me some very interesting advice...

Somewhere around the second half of September, a cable recalled me back to Warsaw. For the time being, I went there alone, without my family. I arrived at the CC where it was officially communicated to me that I had been confirmed as Economic Advisor to the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party. Formally, however, my identity pass stated that I had the title of 'Inspector' which is one level below deputy-chief of division in the CC. It was only a few years later, after I had left this position that my successor, prof. Paweł Bożyk, was named director of division and headed a whole team of consultants.

I was given a room on the second floor /in Poland it would correspond to the first floor/ facing Nowy Świat Street /New World Street/ in the direction of Plac Trzech Krzyży /Three Crosse Place/. Just next to my room an officer from BOR / Biuro Ochrony Rządu - Security Bureau of the Government/ was sitting at a table. He guarded the access of the French window which lead to Gierek's room and to the meeting room of the Politburo.

Just behind the desk of the Security was a glass wall giving into the 'hot line' room where emergency was held around the clock. The 'hot line' was a special teletype communication circuit with Moscow.

After some time, I received a governmental 'special line', a four digit telephone serviced by the Communication Division of the Ministry of Interior which, as it was rumored, was bugged by the Soviets. Only high Party, Government and Army officials disposed of such a telephone. The same was also true of some functionaries of the Soviet embassy. The latter, however, did not figure on the list of subscribers published in a small brown book binded in skin. This book was secret. In case someone did not have the number of a Soviet diplomat, he could call the 'Number Office' of the Ministry of Interior, under the number 88-88, and obtain it.

It is worth to devote some time to the Security Service /BOR/ which constituted a special unit subordinated to the Ministry of Interior. I knew some of the officers from my previous work in the Central Committee. I was astonished by the fact that Gierek did not dismiss them. They had ser-

ved Bierut, Ochab and Gomulka. And now, they were working for Gierek. But, in reality, was it them that they served? I wondered why Gierek did not change them. Maybe there was nothing he could do about it? In any case, during Gierek's frequent absences from work, these officers roamed about his office. It was obvious to me that the office was bugged. And, if it were only the Poles who bugged it... There must have certainly been some other involvement... Just in case, I decided that, while in Gierek's room, I better not become too talkative.

And so, I began my work. Since there was no past experience in this field, I did not know of what exactly my work was to consist. I imagined that Gierek would invite me for a long discussion concerning my work. Nothing of that sort occurred. Therefore, I came to see him, He received me and wished me, as if nothing had ever occurred, success. He did not clearly answer any of my questions. All he said was that we shall see...

Nobody else could inform me further on this matter. Formally, I was attached to the Chancery of the Secretariat of the Central Committee which had, at its head, Henryk Marian, a good chap. But it was not to him that belonged the affairs which I, in my inclearly defined competence, was to treat. Only Waszczuk informed me that whenever I was to send something to Gierek, I should underline the important places in the text because ''the old fellow likes it''.

It was not like that that I had imagined the beginnings of my work and, from the very start, I was disagreeably surprised. As far as the roles of various advisors were concerned, I had read quite a deal about them. I was rather well acquainted with that of the advisors to the American president. I thought that something similar had been planned in the PPR, but I quickly understood that this was not, God forbid, the case.

Among Gierek's collaborators there was, the already mentioned, Jerzy Waszczuk, Gierek's personal secretary, a rascal and a pretentious man. He simultaneously fulfilled the function of Inspector and, later, of Head of the Chancery, Secretary of CC and Alternate Member of the Politburo. Another of these close collaborators was Henryk Marian, Head of Chancery, I myself and two, alternatively working, secretaries. They were both young and pretty and sent to the Central Committee from the Ministry of Interior, by Franciszek Szlachcic. To tell the truth neither of the secretaries could have inquired into any affair. They were seated, at desks, in front of Gierek's office and, at the most, knew whether Gierek was alone, or talking on the phone, although they hardly ever connected his conversations. They did not look through any of the correspondence or in-coming material. At the utmost, they left newspapers on his desk. However, once the career of

Szlachcic was over, both of them were dismissed from the CC and this, within one day. They did not even return to work in the Ministry of Interior. There were also two non-professional précis-writers and, of course, the technical personnel under the orders of Mrs. Bożena Łopatriuk who was later to become deputy head of the Chancery.

The head of Gierek's security was Colonel Pastecki, a dark-haired man under 50 years of age. He was later dismissed for some closely undisclosed reasons /it was being said that he had embezzled some money./

Gierek had not gone through the hard school of conspiracy of the war time period. Having lived in France and Belgium, he did not have any close contact with situations as perilous as those which were experienced by the Communists acting in Poland and the USSR. Therefore, he was probably not well oriented in many cases and was certainly less prudent than other activists. Knowing this, I decided to be on the alert. I was only too well oriented in the penetration of the PPR by the Soviet 'seven' and not only by it. I reckoned with the fact that not only I myself, but also Gierek, could fall victim of some provocation. Somebody had warned me that Gierek, in case of even the slightest suspicion, did not have the custom of defending his collaborators or even inquiring about the nature of the problem. I was later to experience the truth of this warning on my own skin. Once I had left the Central Committee, I was told that, when his two secretaries had been discharged, he was not at the least worried. He had not even asked for the reason...

But let us return to the question of my duties. Since I was Gierek's Advisor, I had to do something. But what, really?

One of my duties, although still not precisely specified, was to look through the economic materials that were to be discussed during the Politburo debates. I was to underline certain things and write a two-page paper for Gierek. This latter duty was my personal invention. I must digress here.

In Gomułka's times, the Politburo met rarely, sometimes even every three months and hardly ever in its entire composition. Things were different under Gierek. The meetings, in full set, were scheduled once a week and the debates were assisted even by the members of the Secretariat of the CC, who were not always members of the Politburo. The debates took place in a room adjacent to Gierek's office and were mostly held on Tuesdays. As a rule, they began at 10a.m. and never lasted more than three hours, sometimes even less and very rarely longer.

The debates of the Politburo were widely echoed by the mass media. Whenever such a debate took place, the TV and radio evening broadcasts, had this information at the first position. On the next day it occupied the headlines

of the newspapers. It was not important that the communiqués were laconic and did not always mention all the points of the agenda of the debates. The information was first-ranking and was often accompanied by a commentary. Mostly, such communiqués, as well as the commentaries, emphasized, the Politburo's concern for the affairs of the citizens of the PPR. The impression had been created that nothing escapes the Politburo's attention. Yet another impression had been fabricated in a similar fashion. This time, it concerned the alleged control, by the Politburo, of the Government. The Politburo was Incessantly 'enjoining the Government to do something'.

In any case, the authorities believed that the whole country waited to hear the communiqués about the Politburo debates. All this finally led to a paradox. Believing that the Nations was frantic about the debates, they also believed another thing and mainly that it were the Tuesday Politburo debates which decided of the stability of the Nation. It was feared that the lack of a communiqué on Tuesday, would lead to some kind of panic in the country. Therefore, the communiqués were always broadcast on Tuesday, even if they actually took place on Monday or Wednesday, the latter case being far worse.

The case, however, is not as innocent as it would seem. No historian, working on a reasearch and using official communiqués of the PPR, will never learn the date on which the debates actually took place. The Socialist system had reached such a degree of hypocrisy that even such harmelss things as the noting down of the Politburo debates swerve from historical truth. But only if this kind of hipocrisy were concerned!

But let us look closer at my duties connected with these debates. But let me digress once more and describe the technique of these debates.

The Politburo always 'worked' according to a preestablished quarterly scheme, although the program extended for a longer period than this term. I myself prepared such plans and programs. As a rule, no more than three or four agenda points were discussed. Two or three of these points concerned economic affairs / personel questions were not discussed. These were circulated among some of the Politburo members and arranged between them./

Frankly speaking, I could not quite understand the point of discussing economic issues during these debates. But since the Politburo was to 'control' the government, so it could not have been otherwise.

The Government, that is the Council of Ministers or the Presidium of the Government, also met once a week, on Fridays, and discussed at least 25 agenda points. At least 20 of these concerned economic affairs. Therefore, the 'haphazard control' pushed out some of these points for the Politburo debates, where they played the role of 'representation'. The points which

had found their way to the Politburo debates, and were so 'controlled', had to be discussed by the Government anyway. On that occasion, these points never ended by any binding resolutions, but by so-called 'preliminary' ones. It was only when the Politburo had discussed the matter, that the point was once again scheduled for Government debates and a final and binding resolution was taken.

In practice, this was just a mere doubling of work and, besides, the control exercised by the Politburo was a sheer illusion. The economic affairs which found their way to the Politburo were never of any crucial importance, for these were rare even at the Government debates. They were, mostly, insignificant affairs and so, by the force of things, only these were discussed by the Politburo. They concerned, for example, breeding of sweet water fish in the State Farm nurseries, etc...

All this was even far more bizarre in practice. As mentioned, there supposedly existed plans and programs of the Politburo works and the Government knew, in advance, what was to be discussed at each Politburo debate. If the matter was discussed by the Government, the latter was obliged to furnish the corresponding materials to the Central Committee not later than a week before the scheduled date of the Politburo debate. Yet, this was only pure theory. For, in practice, I cannot remember one single case when the Government observed this rule. Not during my advisorship, at least.

Technically speaking then, the matter presented itself as follows. The Government discussed something, planned for the Politburo's 'control', on Friday. The next day, that is on Saturday, mostly in the afternoon, the corresponding documents scheduled for ^{the} Politburo debate, were delivered to me to the Central Committee. Such materials if, for example they concerned some kind of annual plan, could contain several hundred pages. And so, I had to take it all back home and read it, throughout the Saturday afternoon and the entire day of Sunday. But even if the questions were trivial, there was no possibility of obtaining any additional information for all prominent figures disappeared from Warsaw on Saturday afternoon. In case I had any doubts there was nobody whom I could have called. And anyway, I did not want to do this from my home because of the possible accusation that I use my town phone for confidential matters. I did not, as many higher officials of the PPR, dispose of any special 'government' telephone. And anyway, the people whom I could have actually called would have never been at home.

The question then, was troublesome. But if, after having stayed overtime in the Central Committee, I had time to write the 2-page paper about the material at work, the officer on duty took it and delivered it to Gierek at his Warsaw residence at the Parkowa Street. But even this was pure theory.

As a rule, Gierek was absent from Warsaw on Saturdays and Sundays. He either spent the weekends in his native region /Katowice/ or in Łańsk or still somewhere else.

In case I had to take the documents back home, it was only on Monday that my paper was typed in the Chancery and it was only then that it was delivered to Gierek.

In such an event, another problem arose. For sometimes the debates took place on Monday morning. In consequence, Gierek not only did not have the time to read the materials with the underlinings prepared for him, but probably even my paper. The whole business did not work much better even if the debate took place on Tuesday or even Wednesday, since Gierek could have been absent from Warsaw on one of his numerous 'out of town-field' visits.

What more, I did not always succeed in talking with him, prior to the Politburo debates and so could not discuss the questions which were to be on the agenda.

Gierek's style of work was relaxed. He arrived at the Central Committee about 9a.m. As he left his Parkowa residence, a buzzer on the desk of the officer on duty signaled it. The entire security was then on the alert. After a short while the doors opened - Gierek had 'free passage'. No obstacle could create the slightest disturbance. Approximately seven minutes after his departure from the Parkowa Street, Gierek tottered into the secretariat. Col. Pastecki, who carried Gierek's briefcase, hurried behind him. In case Gierk had an overcoat, he also helped him take it off in the secretariat.

Several people always awaited Gierek in front of his office because it was not in Gierek's habit to preschedule his visits. He was then 'hunted' for. And the first come was the first served.

In such a situation, I had a fierce concurrence. He was being awaited by Politburo members and Central Committee Secretaries. However, when seeing me, Gierek always took me with him to his office. By the force of things, I was at the bar of time. The debate of the Politburo was to begin in one hour's time and there were some other people with business to settle with him. For this reason, I never wanted to remain with him for too long for I did not want to expose myself to the displeasure of those waiting in the secretariat. After all, they were much more powerful personalities than myself...

Owing to historical truth, I must however say that, he never gave me the impression of being in a hurry, but he rarely stuck to the subject of my report. My impression was that he simply did not know the question, that is, he did not have the time to acquaint himself with it earlier. And this was confirmed during the debates themselves. He always pronounced his summary looking into my paper...

Since I touched upon the subject of my discussions with Gierek, I must state that he never urged me to leave but, willingly, talked with me, changing the subject. He absolutely wanted to know 'what was being said'. I avoided such discussions. I was retained not only by the bugging but also by the fact that I knew only too well the gossip of the Central Committee. I did not want to get involved in it and I didn't even want to repeat it partly. I was afraid of getting entangled in some affairs which, in fact, were completely alien to me.

Despite Gierek's manners which were haughty, it would be incorrect to say that he was not pleasant. He abstained from crude words so beloved by others, especially by those of the 'Moscow school'. He carefully chose his words which were to attest to his erudition. His manners were irreproachable and I must admit that I liked to talk with him, were it not for the realities which awaited me behind the doors of his office. There was never a thing on his desk, with the exception, at the most, of the French 'Le Monde'.

I had free access to Gierek and it never happened that he would send me away saying that he had no time to receive me. Only that, in these cases, our discussion could never concern the Politburo debates. On my side, I never abused of his time or importuned him. I went to see him only when it was necessary. But it never happened that he himself would ask me for a meeting or for a critical analysis of some subject. During our talks he has never raised a subject which would have permitted me to sound him.

For an advisorship in economic affairs, which were supposed to be the very breath of Gierek's life, all this was, at the least, very queer. But, unfortunately, very true.

Returning to the subject, however, I must say that, in truth, I have almost never had the occasion of discussing, with Gierek, the affairs being the subject of the Politburo debates. And, in the end, this was supposed to have been the principal task of my work with him. Moreover, as I already mentioned, he sometimes clearly gave me to understand that he did not want to talk about this.

Well, it was not this form of my activity which was decisive here and I understood this very quickly. So, I began to think what I could do at all.

After having brought my family back from Geneva, in October 1971 and, after having liberated myself from various other things linked with a resettlement in Warsaw, I began to think seriously about the organization of my work which was so bizarre. My first experience was far from being encouraging but I did not give in to pessimism which began taking hold of me. Regardless of Gierek's absorption with the preparations for the Sixth Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party, I was determined to stick my neck out and present a

series of initiatives.

To begin with, I was fully aware of the fact that the economic system of the PPR, without even mentioning the socio-political one, needed a profound reform. For evident reasons, I was thus interested in the plan of such a reform. That, by the way, was the main reason for which I had accepted the advisorship to Gierk. I simply wanted to see, for myself, what was possible to be done. All the reforms, the economic ones included, found themselves in the so-called Szydlak Team / Szydlak was then Secretary of CC to Economic Affairs/. And it was this very team which had an economic reform under preparation. The Team has been laboring almost a year already and half of it worked on the economic reform. Little was to be heard about the advance of their work, however. I then decided to interest myself in the question.

I didn't even attempt to speak with Szydlak himself since, a priori, I assumed that this would have been a loss of time. Szydlak did not have the faintest idea about economy.

Instead, I decided to see two co-chairmans from the team, Stanisław Kuziński, Head of Division of the CC /which was later 'baptized' Economic/ and Józef Pajestka. I have known both of them for many years, although not closely. Concerning Kuziński, I had him for a sensible and intelligent man, although I knew that he was mainly interested in the affairs of his numerous mistresses and that, moreover, he was a complete cynic. At that time, he probably knew that his days in the CC were **numbered**, a fact that was soon to be confirmed /he became Chairman of the Chief Central Statistical Office and also received the nomination of professor of Economics/. I began my discussion with him by exposing my views of the economic reform, which were rather of the 'market economy' type. I had not encountered such an orientation in the preliminary propositions of the reform with which I had earlier acquainted myself. Kuziński listened to my arguments and briefly replied that they will not pass because of 'ideolo' reasons, that is ideological ones. Frankly speaking, I must say that I had similar suspucions, but still, I wanted to hear his opinion. He was, despite his side weeknesses, a person with his feet on the ground and knew what he was talking about.

By the force of things, out discussion proved abortive. Kuziński was not eager to do anything and, generally speaking, everything linked to the reform probably did not interest him anymore.

I then went to professor Józef Pajestka who, at that time, was one of the eleven or so Vice-Chairmen of the State Planning Commission. He was a genuine and known economist and he would have probably been more respected had he not, by the end of the 60's, gotten involved with Jaszczuk, Economic Affairs Secretary in the CC, under Gomułka. It was the 'policy of incentives' of

Jaszczuk which was one of the reasons leading , in December 1970, to the bloody events in Gdańsk. Pajestka also wrote a controversial article in the weekly 'Polityka', which was entitled 'Lard or Dress'. I myself wrote an article polemizing with his but 'Polityka' did not print it. Nevertheless, I had a high opinion of Pajestka.

To my big surprise, Pajestka also gave me the impression of not being interested in any economic reform. He was not even acquainted with a whole range of the reform's propositions as, for example, those in the field of finance. He would either say that he did not agree with something or that, simply, he did not know what the matter was about. A paradoxical situation had been created. An economic reform was to be born and it had no parents!

The situation was indeed very confused. The text of the final version of the reform counted over 600 pages. The guiding thought, if it did exist, was visibly lost somewhere. The conception of the reform itself was highly inconsistent. This was not at all astonishing. Only one single person or, at the most several people, can come up with a firm and solid conception, but it is impossible for nearly 200 people. For, in the latter case, one can observe 'concept negotiations' and the resulting common denominator of opinions is the resultant of compromises and does not have any logical relation. There is also a lack of relation between the individual segmentary proposals. They cancel each other mutually.

In this situation, I gave Gierek a negative opinion of the reform project which was to be debated. During the Politburo, neither Szydlak nor, and the more so, Kuziński and Pajestka, defended their project. Only Szydlak perogated somewhat but the other two hardly spoke a word. However, the minister of the Machine Industry, Tadeusz Wrzaszczyk, who, as member of the Team was present at the Politburo debate, rose to speak in a queer way. He pronounced several sacramental sentences and repeated, several times, that the reform should be 'organic'. He did not specify what he understood by this term and did not explain why he thought so.

The discussion of the reform came to its end very quickly. It did not ensue that it would be undertaken once more. My impression was that nobody needed it anymore, for the enthusiasm for any reforms was dying. Life was taking the old course and things even seemed quite well off. Why then, change something?

Nevertheless, I wanted to take the risk and set about the question by myself. Since years now, I had a well established opinion about the functioning of the 'socialist economy'. Although, I did not think that the capitalist economy is a problem-free one, it was better by a long chalk than the socialist one. But proposing to the Central Committee, the restoration of

capitalism, did not, of course, have the slightest chance of being accepted. Without even mentioning the easily foreseeable consequences for the author of such a conception.

Hence, my 60-page long conception was a mixture of the Hungaro-Yugoslav model with emphasis on individual farming and handicraft which did not exist, and still doesn't, in the models of these two countries. As far as these two questions were concerned, I was encouraged by the fact that Gierrek, similarly to Gomułka, did not yet talk about collectivisation of farming and did not give a crushing blow to handicraft.

And so, I presented Gierrek with the text of my propositions for an economic reform. As I later learned, Gierrek sent the text to some of the Politburo members, with the adnotation 'very interesting'.

Afterwards, came a long silence. One day, I started talking to him about it.

'- Comrade Rurarz! No reforms, please!' He cried out point-blank categorically and loudly.

'- Why?' I asked.

'- Eh, if only we were alone....' He answered with sadness in his voice and added a gesture with his hand which was to mean that it was not about the solitude in his office that he was concerned.

This event almost made me present my resignation immediately. My entire hope of doing something was ruined. After all, I knew that if there was somebody in the entire PPR who could do something in the field of reforms, it were the highest authorities of the Polish United Workers' Party. Nobody else besides them. And it was this last chance which slipped from under my feet and left me without any doubts as to why it was so. It was as if I hadn't known earlier. I did, but this time, I knew it with all the certainty and, in addition, in some kind of terrifying and brutal light.

The problem was ^{not} that, some of the concepts of the reform were unacceptable. No! There was simply to be no reform!

I didn't see any further perspective for my work, after this event. My advisorship to Gierrek had sense only if I managed to convince him to the directions of a reform, even in the most general sense. Thus, my further remaining at the given post was beside the purpose. I did not intend to make any personal career here, just as I had never dreamed of any career in the PPR, contrarily to the accusations of 'Trybuna Ludu'.

And still, I decided not to surrender. Presenting my resignation after only a few eeks would really have not been serious. I had to go on. Since it was not possible to make a real reform, I thought, then, I had to try to attain my goal with fragmentary reforms, by passing through the 'back door'.

I then decided to work on a reform of domestic prices. The price problem was the haunting ghost of the Polish economy. This was the case not only in the PPR, but in all the so-called 'socialist countries', with the exception of Yugoslavia and, at that time, partly Hungary, who somehow got along with it thanks to the help of limited market mechanisms. As known, the problem of a rise in prices of some food products led, in December 1970, to a bloody wave of protests in Gdańsk and to the fall of Gomułka. At the very beginning, Gierek didn't even want to cancel the price increase, but he was forced to it by the attitude of women textile workers in Łódź.

For the time being, the problem was appeased, but not solved. The whole affair was only building up its explosive force and this, faster than ever before. The income of the population was rising because of the acceleration of the growth rate of the country. The supply of consumption goods on the market was very rigid. In addition, absurdities in the field of prices were monstrous. In any case, if I remember well, in 1971, the consumption of food was subsidized by 46 billion zlotys taken from the state budget. These spendings were compensated by the earnings the budget made on consumption taxes of : alcohol, which brought 42 billion zlotys; tobacco 4 billion zlotys; and chocolate 0,5 billion zlotys.

What worse, the nonsense of such a system lay in the fact that, not only was it necessary to drink more vodka and smoke more cigarettes in order to eat, but, even if the supplies of food grew above the limits predicted by the plan, it was considered to be some kind of catastrophe, because there was not enough money in the budget for the subsidies!

I pass over such absurdities as the relation in prices of one kilogram of bread which was lower than one kilogram of grain. This led to massive waste of cheap bread and even to its use, in place of fodder, for horses and other domestic animals.

That is not all. The relations of food product prices and industrial consumption products prices were just as senseless. For example, the price of one kilogram of raw beef loin was equal to half the price of stockings. In the West, this relation is 1:10.

Some products, then, were subsidized from the state budget whereas, in regard of others, they resorted to the so-called accumulation which raised their prices artificially.

I then worked out a principle of price change. According to my conception, food prices were to increase by no more than 10 per cent a year, whereas prices of industrial consumption products, especially those of the light industry, were to fall by the same amount. Moreover, the entire operation was to be combined with wage adjustments and regulation of other services.

Some abnormalities would probably not have been avoided but, such a reform, would have been 'shockless', spread over a period of time and reasonably painless. In the course of a long period of time, it would have been possible to introduce corresponding corrections. Of course, the principles of the reform would have been previously made known to the people.

Gierek acquainted himself with the proposal but did not react to it. I then provoked a discussion with him on this topic.

'- I will not change the prices for 5 years'' he declared to me categorically.

'- After 5 years, Comrade Secretary, you shall not change them at all'' I attempted to polemicize with him.

'- Oh, no. I'll change them.'' He replied to my polemic.

What could I have done? He did not give in to my proposal.

Today, it is known that an attempted food price increase /of meat and dairy products/, attempted in June 1976, had not succeeded. Violent protests in Radom, Ursus and other centers, forced the government to withdraw them. Just as later similar attempts ended later in a wave of protests in July and August, 1980.

As proposed above in the discussion, Gierek did not forget it. In April 1974, when I arrived from Geneva to Poland for a brief holiday, Gierek received me for almost one hour. Among others, he referred to the price reform. He told me that he was to carry it through the next year, that is 1975.

'- And will it succeed?'' I asked.

'- Of course it will succeed! You are abroad and you don't know the moods here...'' He answered in a self-assured tone.

And yet, as we know, it did not succeed.

Another issue that I then attacked was the question of PPR's economic ties with foreign countries.

It appeared to me that excessive closing of trade frontiers and limiting them to CMEA countries, which accounted for an average 60 per cent of the Polish turnover, was detrimental for the development /not even accelerated/ of the PPR. These countries had neither credit capacities, nor many raw materials or food products and their industrial products were below standards universally binding world trade.

It was then necessary to turn in the direction of non-CMEA countries, mostly developing ones whose share in PPR'S trade was low and did not manifest any tendency towards growth/ on the average, it fluctuated in the limits of seven per cent/. At the same time, while even preserving the share of the developed countries in the turnover of the PPR, as it was, it was possible to change its structure by making capital of them for the import

of modern technology and machines. This also concerned credits for, at that time, OPEC countries did not give them massively. So, the diminishing of the share of CMEA countries in PPR's trade was concerned.

From here stemmed my idea to relate Poland to the world market and not only to CMEA countries. I then proposed that the share of CMEA countries should be no greater than 50 per cent, that of the developed countries 35 per cent and that of developing countries 15 per cent /which doubled their then current share/. These suppositions were, in a certain degree, the repetition of a thesis I developed in a paper written in 1969 for UNCTAD.

In general, I did not believe in the development of trade, and the more so in the economic integration with CMEA countries. I did not make this a secret, even on the pages of ''Życie Gospodarcze''. Apart from the USSR, these countries had no raw materials which could interest us. And the USSR, besides the raw materials, got rid, to us, of its machines and appliances which, apart from the armament, were qualitative junk, such as, for example, passenger planes and, in the final count everything else.

On this occasion, it is worth adding an explanation. There existed an unwritten principle that non-socialist countries could have a 50 percent share in the turnover of a CMEA country. This much was permitted. More

ould have been dangerous /several years later, during Polono-Soviet talks, it was reproached that the share of CMEA countries in PPR's turnover, had a tendency to fall below this 50 per cent barrier/. Moreover, proposing an increased share of the developing countries, rather than that of Western developed ones, was ''safer''. It was always possible to explain that there were no hidden ''imperialistic intentions''.

In the paper, I also mentioned the necessity of direct ties between Polish industry and the so-called global corporations, that is, Western firms, which had money, technology and excellent marketing. Thanks to their assistance, it was easier to participate in the international network of trade and finance, all this based on principles of some partnership. Certain inefficient attempts to do this were later undertaken.

Western credits, were yet another question. On a small scale, all this began under Gomulka, but then, these credits concerned mostly the purchase of American agricultural surpluses in the framework of Title I of Act PL480.

It was obvious to me that internal sources of accumulation were not sufficient for an even average growth, without even talking about an accelerated one, especially if Gierek truly wanted to realize the slogan ''that Poland may acquire strength and that the people may live in plenty''. The internal accumulation had to be completed by an external one. The realization of this was yet another problem but there could have been no doubts as

to the principle. Almost everybody in the world did this and the PPR did not have to be an exception in this matter.

For a reason I cannot recall now, I have never discussed these problems with Gierek, although I did, fragmentarily, discuss with him questions of our cooperation with foreign countries.

All this is still far from exhausting the problem of my activities as Gierek's Advisor. I invented many other occupations. Like, for example, I touched, with Gierek, upon the subject of selling to people not only of housing cooperative, but also state apartments. This was quite a peculiar problem. When people had children, they also had right to a bigger surface. With time, when the children would leave home, the couple, left alone or even reduced, lost, de facto, the right to a greater surface. The rehousing of people, their displacement from lived-in and familiar places, was painful. And, in case they were not rehoused, they were oppressed for having a too big living surface. In their new apartments, on the other hand, they could not, for lack of space, receive their children and grand-children and, generally speaking, all this was somehow inhuman.

Moreover, people, and I was fully aware of this, have a drive to possess something that would be their own. To have a "'corner of one's own'", occupies here the most important place and is probably the object of dreams of every human being. People are ready for sacrifices in order only to secure such a "'corner'" and, once they own it, they take care of it in a far better way than any state or cooperative administrations.

I then presented the affair to Gierek and, after a lively discussion, he agreed that I was right. And, in truth, the sale of apartments and even family houses did come about. Only that I had no influence on the acting legislature which was far from being the best. But at the time it was formulated, I had already resigned from my post. Still, I was satisfied that I did something and I appreciated Gierek's approval.

Another question which interested me were individual telephones. Anybody who knows something about life in the PPR knows what a problem the installation of a telephone is. The list of those awaiting the installation was becoming longer each year and the average period of wait exceeded 15 years! Many people, willing to have a phone, did not even inscribe themselves on the lists, for they did not believe that there was any sense in doing this, since there were no chances of getting one. In addition to this, came all the bribes and operations demoralizing those who wanted to possess this miracle of technology. The worst thing was that even in the newly built apartment buildings, there were no chances of having a telephone installed. And finally, the plans for the future made clear that nothing in this field

was to improve. I decided to do something. Therefore, I began to torment Gierek with the problem. I even remember showing him Spanish statistics which clearly stated that 10 times more telephones were installed yearly in Spain than in Poland. The population and the level of development of both countries were comparable... I also explained to him that installing a telephone was no favor to the people. In the whole world /capitalist, of course/ this is an extremely profit-yielding affair and it was only in Poland that it was subsidized.

Gierek was finally persuaded and I, myself, signed this matter as an agenda item for the Politburo debates, twice. It is worth adding that, on this occasion, I met the then Minister of Communications, E.Kowalczyk, who presently fulfills the functions of Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of the Central Committee of the Democratic Party. He once explained to me that the Soviet military authorities were beginning to press on him in order to have all of PPR's international communications pass through... Moscow! I repeated this to Gierek. He nervously cried out that, never! This was a positive mark for him.

As far as the development of telephone services in the country was concerned, despite the resolutions undertaken by the Politburo and even despite some investments, /cables were chiefly lacking/, the problem was far from being solved. The whole situation probably even worsened for people believed that something was to be done and more of them applied for the phones...

For a moment, it would be good to return to the question of economic relations with abroad. I already mentioned that I occasionally talked about them with Gierek.

I was beginning to be worried by the mess that was being created in this field. Purchases made abroad began seriously wandering away from the plan. This would not have been such a tragedy if only somebody had control over the process. But this was not so. The reform of the foreign trade apparatus, initiated under Gomulka, gave, to many economic departments, the authority to pursue foreign trade operations. This, in itself, would not have been bad if only these departments would have been prepared for this. When, however, they had the green light, they poured out towards the West. Without any experience, and often falling victims to bribes, posteriorly only partly disclosed, they bought massively. Nobody even knew exactly what, where and for how much was bought. Neither the Planning Commission, nor the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Maritime Economy, nor individual departments nor the Commercial Bank knew all this...

Gierek even acknowledged that I was right to be worried about this, but that was all he did.

'- Well, we'll see, we'll see...' he would answer. And, in fact, we did see.

I managed to arouse Gierek's interest in our trade relations with Sweden. I knew by heart the problems of Polish foreign trade. I had treated them in my book, in a manual and in numerous articles and brochures. Besides that, starting in 1967, I was giving lectures on that subject at the Central School of Planning and Statistics. I could then see some disadvantageous phenomena in Polish foreign trade. One of them was Sweden's dramatic drop of share in Polish trade turnover. This did not concern any comparison with the prewar period, when Sweden was one of our biggest trade partners, but even with 1950, when this share reached 5 per cent in the PPR. In 1971 it dropped to 1 per cent only. It was probably with this country that our trade relations looked the worst.

Sweden, I explained to Gierek, is a neutral country, a highly developed one and, moreover, practically a neighbour, for the Baltic Sea is only a big lake. He agreed with me. The question was discussed twice at the Politburo debates. As a result, our Commercial Counselor in Stockholm, Świtajła, who, together with our Ambassador Fejm, was invited for both debates, was admonished, like an callow youth, by Gierek, for having an incorrect approach to the problem. To tell the truth, Gierek was right. What resulted of all this is yet another problem. As I was to learn later, it was not much, even though a green light flashed for our turnover with Sweden. Some of the transactions were of a criminal nature, to be frank. One of them was the well known Intraco affair.

One of my other functions was to get acquainted with the secrets of the functioning of PPR's economy. I did, if course, have a certain idea about it, but I was conscious of the fact that one can spend one's whole life on studying it without much of a result. The imagination was highly challenged by monstrosities one could encounter in this field!

Gierek also wanted to sound these secrets and, about once a week, and sometimes more frequently, he paid 'field visits' thinking that he was learning about the realities of life in the PPR. I never accompanied him.

The security officers would tell me how such visits were staged and I didn't have the slightest wish of participating in such pre-prepared shows. And, in any case, Gierek, has never proposed to take me along with him, although, if I would have asked to come, he would have certainly accepted.

I think it is worth illustrating this with an example recounted to me by one of the security officers. Gierek visited once a state farm and his attention was drawn by the look of the cows' coats which he found extremely shiny and peculiar. The cow barn overseer had certainly not been suffi-

ciently well instructed by the farm's director, for he explained to Gierek that he had been ordered to wash the cows with... shampoo, so that they would present themselves nicely for Gierek's visit...

Generally speaking, Gierek's visits were of no surprise to anybody. They were announced at least two days earlier, for the region was to be made ''secure''. The details of the visit always leaked on time to those who were interested, and the result was that, not only did Gierek not learn the truth, but observed a stage-managed reality. He spoke with fictive employees, saw articles which were not being produced and learned many unexisting things. It did happen several times that all this took a different course, but these were only rare exceptions.

Therefore, the visits, as well as my accompanying him on them, had no sense at all. Thus, I decided to create my own channel for acquiring knowledge about reality. What I did was to take the telephone directory, look up all kinds of directors, chief engineers or even head accountants and, asking for discretion, I invited them to see me in the Central Committee. In order not to confuse them, I led them into the building without any pass. I offered them coffee and biscuits to which I was entitled and then, we would sometimes discuss for hours in end. I never took any notes of what was being said and never, of course, taped anything, in order not to frighten my guests.

Had I gone to their place of work, not only would that have made noise about the whole matter but, moreover, they would have never had enough courage to be sincere. Even the way it was, they would, for the first two hours, repeat over and over again that everything was fine. Slowly, however, they would tell the truth. My God, what did I not learn!

As mentioned, I thought that the questions concerning the functioning of PPR's economy were not unknown to me. Working for 15 years in foreign trade, which, after all, is the focus of all economy, I knew a lot. I spoke with people who not only built its history but the history of the entire economy. I went through all of the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and, thanks even to various Party actions, I had a certain contact with industry.

And yet, as it turned out, I hardly knew a thing about the subject. I had, if my memory is exact, about 42 such discussions. It is true that I have never talked with representatives of coal-mines, power stations or metallurgical plants. This was my final intention. But still, my respondents came from the field of construction, engineering projects, manufacturing production and various other services.

In all cases, the beginning of the discussion was the same. Everything was just great! Step by step though, they started talking about their dif-

difficulties and, some of them, passing to the so-called "objective difficulties" depicted a tragic situation.

These people were on the verge of madness and crime... They would keep their companies and themselves living, thanks to the use of lies, bribery, relations, insolence and goodness, but also cunning, professional knowledge, intelligence and experience. Unfortunately, they were often employed in a demoralizing and improper way. I was sick at heart by the image they depicted before my eyes. I clearly saw the great inherent reserves in PPR's economy, the wasted effort and talents.

Some of those who came to see me, thought that they were coming for some kind of preliminary investigation for, each one of them, felt guilty about some kind of real or imagined fault. One of them had, in the lapel of his vest, a black ribbon worn in Poland as a sign of mourning. I then wanted to console him upon the presumed death of a loved person.

"- No, no. None of my close relatives died. I simply wanted to arouse a feeling of compassion and that's why I put it on" my guest explained with embarrassment. And then, he told me frankly, what kind of crime he perpetrated. Just simply, in order to realize the plans of his engineering works, he had several tip trucks with licence plates acquired on the crook and which were not on his inventory list...

The meeting always ended with the same question :

"- If I granted you the ownership of the enterprise you run by how much would the production rise?"

Unavoidably, this created consternation. After a time needed for reflection, they would answer in a meager voice estimating by how much they would increase the production. Not one of them, and I emphasize this point, did ever mention an increase lower than 100 per cent. Some of them mentioned a possible increase of 600 per cent! Yes, 600 per cent! Certain of them told me that, if they had a completely free hand in the choice of their personnel and their production profile, they would be able to realize the plans with one fifth of their present crew! But this, of course, would not have been possible with the wages as they were.

I believed that these people were not lying. In the West, their stories would be first grade material for horror movies, but in the PPR it was only plain sad truth. It was everyday life...

By the way, I recall an example of something else. One of the building firms out in the country, proposed that it would realize its plan faster and with a diminished crew, only if the laborforce expenses planned for, in the cost calculations of the object, will be given to it as a reward. As far as I can remember, the labor output rose more than ten times /yes,

more than ten times./ The pays were enormous. However, the experiment was quickly hushed down...

The reflections which arose after these discussions and the observation of other events and occurrences, only reinforced me in my conviction that, without deep reforms in the system which, in the final count, would lead to the erosion of the 'Socialist' system, Poland would never extricate herself from 'objective difficulties': That system, very simply, did not work, or rather it did work, but in a direction opposite to the one intended, for the intentions were undoubtedly good, in this case. Not only was there little likelihood for such reforms, but for reforms in general. Thus, I was cocksure that all this was bound to collapse one day and that it will do so with a great deal of noise. That was only a question of time. For, after all, abnormalities cannot last forever. True that A.Solzhenitsyn maintains that Communism exists in spite of laws of physics and logic, but it cannot exist in spite of all laws of economics.

Sonner or later, the hour of truth shall strike.

After the description of all these events it is time to return to the already announced description of Politburo debates. For a period of 16 months, they constituted an integral part of my work and I assisted in almost all of them. I prepared for Gierek proper papers and provided the adequate materials with the aforementioned underlinings.

I am probably the only person in the Free World who, as I mentioned, regularly assisted these debates and listened to all their agenda points.

As said, the Politburo debates took place on Tuesdays and, sometimes, on Mondays and even Wednesdays. They always began at 10a.m. The debate room adjoined Gierek's office and could accomodate some 30 people along a long table. Moreover, longing the walls, there were rows of chairs. Guests invited to assist some of the agenda points of the debates could use them if there was not enough place at the table. Besides this, not far from Gierek, who was always seated at the head of the table, there was a small table where were seated H.Marian, Head of Chancery who watched over the organization of the debate, I myself and a précis-writer. My role was to observe the debates and write down the resolution projects. After some time, I became such an expert that I was able to write the resolution projects without even assisting at the debates. It has never happened that I would have to correct even a comma...

In 'Socialist' countries, there exists a wide variety of various organs and many debates take place. It happened that I assisted those of the Council of Ministers and the Government Presidium, of the Planning Commission's council, of some ministries, of the Senat and of Department coun-

cils in institutions of higher education. And all of them were nothing compared to the Politburo debates! This highest of all organs was, indeed, the example of the worst of debates. All others were summits of intellect when compared to the Politburo!

I did not have the right to pronounce myself during these "debates", but I could observe them as much as I wanted. I write "'debates'" in quotation marks, for they did not correspond to the true meaning of the word.

I had the opportunity of listening to Politburo debates in their pre- and post-Sixth PUDP Congress compositions. Józef Cyrankiewicz, Mieczysław Moczar and Stefan Jędrychowski left the "'old'" pre-Congress Politburo. Franciszek Szlachcic, Henryk Jabłoński and Mieczysław Jagielski were to enter the "'new'" one. There were some other changes among the alternate Politburo members and Secretariat members. All these changes, of course, didn't have the slightest influence on the quality of the debates and on the Politburo's work. Everything functioned as before.

People in Poland may have well thought that, somewhere "'at the top'" somebody racks his brains for their fate. But if only they could have seen and heard what was going on!

As mentioned earlier, the Politburo debates were mostly devoted to economic affairs, although not exclusively. I also mentioned that the majority of the treated questions, came in from debates of the Council of Ministers and Government Presidium. Those members of the Politburo who were simultaneously members of the other two organs heard these problems for the second time. And at least half of these problems, if not more, were of this sort.

My impression was that Jaruzelski and Olszowski who were members of all these organs, did not care at all for all these questions. But the others, those who were not in the Government, gave a similar impression. I am not sure whether it was due to the fact that they have never read the materials prepared for the debate or whether the problem lay somewhere else. Szydlak, Economic Affairs Secretary of the Central Committee, my suppositions went further, was also far from being concerned.

In the "'old'", pre-Sixth PUDP Congress Politburo, the genuinely interested person was Stefan Jędrychowski. At that time, he was Minister of Foreign Affairs, but his previous, many years long function as Chief of the State Planning Commission, did leave a trace of which he could not rid himself. He always took the floor although he raised questions of secondary and tertiary importance. And so, I remember that the question of insurance for individual farmers was raised. Jędrychowski asked then whether there will be enough medication in communal and provincial pharmacies. As a rule,