

Soviets See Arms Talks as but One Aspect Of Waging War, 2 East-Bloc Defectors Say

BY THOMAS G. GULICK
Special to the New York City Tribune

WASHINGTON — Soviet strategists view arms control negotiations as essentially a form of warfare, according to two high-ranking East-bloc defectors.

The Kremlin, according to the two men, not only cheats on arms control agreements but plans in advance how it will cheat, what military advantage the cheating will afford, what risks are involved in the cheating and even how Moscow will most plausibly deny that

it is cheating on a treaty, should violations be unearthed.

The insights of these defectors and others contributed to the conclusions of a study of the Soviet approach to arms control that was conducted by Joseph D. Douglass Jr., a veteran Washington defense analyst.

Douglass performed the study for the CIA 3 years ago, but it has received no coverage in the media. He subsequently received approval to publish the study, which is now on the bookstands in hard cover, entitled *Why the Soviets Violate Arms Control Treaties* (Pergamon-

Brassey).

The purpose of the study was to produce an accurate portrayal of how the Soviets themselves view arms control negotiations with the United States.

To achieve this perspective, Douglass drew on the first-hand experience of five Soviet-bloc defectors — two of them former high-ranking East-bloc communist officials who worked in the upper levels of the military decision-making bureaucracy. He also consulted internal Soviet and East-bloc documentation to confirm the analysis of the defectors.

Both high-ranking defectors, Zdzislaw Rurarz, the former Polish ambassador to Japan, and Jan Sejna, a former Communist Party secretary to

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the Czech Defense Council, state unequivocally that Soviet arms control negotiations are the domain of the Soviet military high command.

Rurarz, in fact, believes that "Moscow may risk starting a [third world] war" under the right conditions, conditions partially created by Soviet strategic gains via "arms control diplomacy."

"The Soviets," Rurarz adds, "know that the NATO allies assume them to be prudent [in the arms control process]. Hence the West may not really believe that the Soviet Union would risk starting a major war. It is precisely on this point that the Soviets may capitalize."

The Soviet Union may "never again have such an opportunity to win a war as it has now" — a fact which, he says, greatly concerns him.

According to Rurarz, "top-ranking military officers" who have been strongly supported by the KGB state security apparatus since Yuri Andropov became its head in 1967 are the real creators of Soviet arms control policy and, indeed, of most Soviet foreign policy in general.

The former Polish official was himself involved for 25 years in his country's military intelligence operations under diplomatic and academic cover.

Civilians, he says, even high-ranking ones such as Gorbachev, don't determine Soviet arms control positions in U.S.-Soviet negotiations. It's the Soviet military.

Since this is the case, he says, the Soviet military has at least two key goals it hopes to achieve through disarmament and arms control parleys with the United States: "(1) to prevent the United States from making SDI [the Strategic Defense Initiative] operational and from developing first-strike weapons to the extent that these could nullify the Soviet edge in ICBMs; and (2) to ban all U.S. nuclear weapons from Western Europe and the Far East (and perhaps also foil French and British nuclear plans)."

Thus, Rurarz remarks, the Soviets "already are fighting a nuclear war with the United States at the negotiating table, and that war is waged by the Soviet military — not by civilian leaders such as Karpov, Kvitsinski and Gorbachev."

Sejna concurs that a top Soviet strategic priority at present is to scuttle any plans by the U.S. president to deploy SDI. This would, and has, included making SDI an arms control bargaining chip, as Gorbachev tried to do in his surprise move at the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland.

Both Sejna and Rurarz reveal that there are actual Soviet official policymaking bodies specializing in cheating on arms control treaties. Sejna points to the "Administration of Special

State Interests" within the Soviet Main Operations Administration, one of the most secret bodies in the Soviet Union, according to Sejna.

He was personally aware, when he was a Czech communist official, that "Special State Interests" was assigned the role of how to hide certain kinds of weapons, both in the Soviet Union and in the East-bloc satellite countries, in order to cheat on arms control agreements that were then being prepared by the Soviets for negotiations with the United States and NATO.

Rurarz notes that disinformation and strategic-deception practices are carried out by the Soviet group called the Strategic Deception War Board (*Voyennoye Upravleniye Strategicheskovo Obmana*) linked to the GRU, or Soviet military intelligence, and its Warsaw Pact equivalents. This group was used to deceive Washington, for instance, during the SALT I negotiations of the early 1970s about the Soviet ability to MIRV their missiles, that is, to fit the weapons with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles.

In an interview, Douglass said that "a few people have had their eyes opened" by his book, but that it has had no apparent effect on U.S. arms control and disarmament policy.

The reason, he said, is that the book is written from a Soviet perspective and "Soviet logic is very different from our type of logic."

Thus, "one really has to sit down and listen to what the various defectors are saying. And this is not an easy process."

Douglass' also asserted that there is a connection between the arms control process and the recent marked increase in Western untied loans, trade and business arrangements with the Soviet Union.

"One of the main forces driving arms control behind the scenes is the international business and financial community," he said. "If the U.S. government is actively pursuing arms control, then why not the financial community? Arms control provides the grease for the financial arrangements to go forward."

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